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ABSTRACT 
 
The common understanding in Egypt is that one of the main reasons behind the 1952 
Revolution was the State’s conspiring with the imperialist powers, and its lack of 
patriotism. This paper argues that this understanding is unfounded, and that Egypt fought 
against colonialism long before 1952.  In fact, the Egyptians were outraged by the 
influence that the British kept in their country during the Second World War.  Therefore, 
ever since Egypt was invited to join the United Nations when it was established in 1945, 
it has seized every opportunity to voice its anti-colonial sentiment.  It aimed at the demise 
of imperialism. Egypt has participated in drafting the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It has also defended the rights of small states at the United 
Nations, and stood by them to acquire independence and self-determination from their 
respective colonial powers.  Egypt also defended the sovereignty of states threatened by 
the ambitions of the poles of the rising Cold War.  It has even gone to war for the sake of 
Palestine’s territorial integrity.  Since the Palestinian war in 1948, one of Egypt’s major 
concerns has been the rights of the Palestinian refugees. In order to be able to fight for its 
ultimate goal, self-determination, Egypt has adopted a policy of impartiality so as not fall 
in either of the two camps of the Cold War.  It has also become a leader in the region 
since the early years of the UN.  Egypt has maintained one continuous line throughout the 
years, that of striving for self-determination and antagonizing all forms of colonialism or 
interference in other states’ affairs.  Its activities at the United Nations from 1945 till 
1952 account for the gradual emergence of Egypt from a colonized country to an 
impartial leading state.  Committed to the sovereignty and self-determination of other 
nations as well as its own, Egypt’s foreign policy has had these same broad lines since 
1945 till today.  
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I. Introduction 
My initial intention was to write about my uncle, Adly Andraos “Bey” (1905-1974), 
who had served Egypt as a politician from the late 1920s, till he left political life for other 
activities in 1952.  He had had an illustrious life and was worthy of a research study.  
Originally a lawyer, then a judge in the Mixed Courts, he was renowned for defending the 
rights of his fellow citizens who were subjected to “hasty and arbitrary judgments.”1 He 
was appointed as a member of the Egyptian delegation to the Conference on International 
Organization in San Francisco in 1945.  Subsequently, having turned down his 
appointment as the first Egyptian Ambassador to the Vatican – with whom he had 
established contacts2 – because he believed that a Muslim should occupy this position, he 
was nominated Egypt’s Ambassador to Greece in 1949 and to France in 1952. More 
importantly, he was a member of the Egyptian delegation to the United Nations three 
more times, namely 1947, 1948 and 1951 - the last year as the head of the delegation, 
where “his fiery protestations rose more than once to request the evacuation of his 
country, – and to rebel against the British occupation of our territory.”3  Among other 
things, he defended Egypt’s rights in the Sudan,4 fought for disarmament, and with much 
courage challenged France, demanding Morocco’s independence.5
                                                             
1 Ester Wahib Doss, In Memoriam  “La Gloire Suit Ceux qu’Elle Est Digne de Conduire” [In Memoriam 
“Glory Follows Those It Is Worthy Of Following” (1974) (unpublished , on file with author)(my 
translation). 
 Articles written by 
diverse personalities and writers after Adly Andraos’s death on March 6th, 1974, reveal 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. Egypt claimed from Britain its right to administer Sudan towards self-government. See MICHAEL 
DORAN, PAN-ARABISM BEFORE NASSER EGYPTIAN POWER POLITICS AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 44-45 (Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
5 Supra note 1. 
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that this man was a patriot who was a source of pride for Egypt and a fanatic of justice 
who imposed his country’s views on the General Assemblies of the United Nations.6
This paper argues, on the basis of the records of Egypt’s participation in the United 
Nations from 1945 when the UN organization was established to 1952 Egyptian 
Revolution, that Egypt had adopted from the start and increasingly promoted a foreign 
policy guided by anti-colonialism, respect for nations’ sovereignty and self-
determination.  It presented itself as a peace and justice loving state, and encouraged 
peaceful settlements, constantly referring to the UN Charter – which it had vividly 
participated in drafting – to legally achieve human rights and the self-determination of 
peoples along the lines of the Charter’s stated purposes.  It had strong sympathy for 
weaker nations, and because of its geopolitical situation, especially for the Arab States, 
the African States, and the Mediterranean States, all of whose interests Egypt strongly 
prioritized.  It struggled for the human dignity of their peoples as embodied mainly in the 
concept of self-determination.  Even when Egypt renounced peace and decided to go to 
  
However, while searching his papers, I realized that Adly Andraos was not alone in 
attacking British occupation or fighting for the independence of nations.  It appeared that 
contrary to what I had been taught during my school years, Egypt was not a pawn 
manipulated by colonialists [at least not in the period which this paper discusses] and it 
did not serve the ends of imperialism. 
                                                             
6 See Georges Zesos,  Adly Andraos magicien du verbe [Adly Andraos magician of the verb], PROGRES 
EGYPTIEN, Apr. 14, 1974 (my translation). See also Mina Badi ᶜ Abdel Malek, Aqbat fi tarikh Misr 
[Copts in the history of Egypt], WATANI, Apr. 1, 2001, at 15 (my translation). See also Mirrit Boutros 
Ghali, Adly Andraos 1905-1974, SOCIETE D’ARCHEOLOGIE COPTE 213 (1974)(my translation). See also 
Hussein Fawzi, Adly Andraos un maître de la diplomatie, (1974) (unpublished, on file with author) (my 
translation). 
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war against the Jews, the inherent ideology behind its action was that of fighting for the 
self-determination of its fellow Arab Palestinians. 
Perhaps the United Nations was a means for Egypt to emerge from an era of colonial 
frustration, and served as a gateway to freedom and expression.  More specifically, in its 
aspiration for its own independence from the British, Egypt was committed to standing by 
all those who suffered colonialism as it had suffered.  It may have become a sacred duty 
to keep the principles of the Charter in line with international relations/politics.  It might 
also have brought to Egypt more security and assurance to gain and maintain its own full 
independence.  The fact is that throughout the period from 1945 till 1952, Egypt did not 
once bow to colonialism within the United Nations.  It did not hesitate once to support 
fellow nations, i.e. nations that suffered from colonial abuse, in defying colonialism and 
working towards full independence and self-determination.  As a smaller nation, Egypt 
was not always heard, but it was certainly capable of making a difference as will be 
shown in this paper.  Suffice it for now to say that some members of the United Nations 
called Egypt “the black sheep and troublemaker of the Orient,”7 but that some have also 
described it as a “link between East and West. . . [playing] a role, at once of a pioneer, 
and an element of peace and stability.”8
                                                             
7 Adly Andraos, Egyptian Delegate to the United Nations, On the Subject of Disarmament, Address 
Before the Political Committee of the United Nations (November 22, 1948). 
  Regardless, then, of its motivations for active 
participation in the United Nations, Egypt certainly made proper use of the Charter’s 
provisions to impose itself, gradually moving from a subjugated nation to one that had a 
voice – a voice that would be heard. 
8 Id.  
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In addition to arguing that Egypt developed an effective anti-colonial policy, this paper 
proposes that Egypt did not, in its fight against imperialism, fall into the opposite camp, 
the USSR.  It will be demonstrated that Egypt maintained its own line, choosing at times 
to side with the Eastern bloc, at others with the West; Egypt had its own opinion, and it 
fought for it – and that opinion was generally one of neutrality, the foretaste of non-
alignment.  Again, Egypt’s making proper use of the Charter and its provisions for human 
rights and self-determination enabled it to keep its neutrality, without being forced to side 
with either bloc. 
The paper further suggests that Egypt’s strong ties with the Arab nations have been a 
tool to empower itself in facing its occupying colonist, and a means to assert its position 
as a leader in the region since 1945. 
The issues discussed in this paper are far from exhaustive of Egypt’s activities in the 
United Nations, it would be impossible to bring a full assessment of these here; these 
issues then are those that are supportive of the three arguments stated above, leading to 
further the hypothesis that even if Egypt witnessed severe internal changes in the 
aftermath of the revolution, its foreign policy of independence, non-alignment, and pan-
Arabism finds its roots in the Kingdom of Egypt’s evolving position on colonialism and 
self-determination at the United Nations. 
One note should be added on the methodology and limitations of the argument.  The 
discussion below is based on unpublished materials related to my uncle’s diplomatic 
activities.  These materials constitute the primary sources for my argument.  They are 
composed of reports on the work of the Egyptian delegations to the United Nations and 
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its Committees, diverse correspondences, and personal notes belonging to Adly Andraos.  
All of these unpublished documents are on file with me.  They have proven very valuable 
for my understanding of Egypt’s activities at the United Nations from 1945 to 1952, as 
they mainly reflect the opinions of the delegations to the UN General Assemblies, and 
thus explain the policies Egypt followed.  Consequently I had to use much of these 
documents to make the point of the argument in this paper.   In other words, all this 
unpublished material is the basis on which the voice of Egypt and its self-perception at 
the United Nations was reconstructed.  This paper, then, does not pretend to be an 
authoritative account of Egyptian history.  It merely relates the story of Egypt’s 
diplomacy at a specific time, the pre-revolutionary era, in a specific field, foreign affairs, 
with particular focus on human rights, sovereignty and self-determination, in the context 
of the United Nations.    
The paper is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter II gives a brief background on 
Egypt’s international policy in 1945, when it was still under British influence, and 
nationalists struggled to achieve complete independence and self-determination.  At the 
time, self-determination was viewed by the West as a means towards peaceful relations 
between nations within the realm of colonialism.  The USSR, however, saw self-
determination as complete riddance from imperialism.  Egypt gradually formed its own 
concept, neither submissive nor aggressive, merely giving itself the right not to side with 
either party. 
Chapter III focuses on Egypt’s participation in drafting the Charter, where its anti-
colonial policy shows to the utmost.  Subsequently elected member of the Political and 
Security Committee, and of the Trusteeship Committee, Egypt further developed its 
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impartial position whereby it continuously worked for self-determination, while 
distancing itself from the Eastern bloc.  This is particularly clear when drafting the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Chapter IV is about Egypt’s activities in the Trusteeship Committee of the United 
Nations, showing its keenness to replace colonialism by the Trusteeship system which 
helps developing nations until they are ready for self-determination. 
Chapter V relates Egypt’s activities in the Political and Security Committee, as it 
intervenes to ensure territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of other states. 
Chapter VI deals with Egypt’s intervention in the Palestinian question. Palestine had 
become the scene of illegal Jewish immigration, instigated by British promises made 
some thirty years earlier, and ending in the establishment of the State of Israel which the 
Arabs refused to recognize. Since the problem was not resolved at the United Nations, 
Egypt’s nationalist, anti-colonial current pushed the government to venture into Palestine, 
fighting to safeguard the territory and the self-determination of the Palestinian people – in 
vain.  Soon, Egypt’s major concern at the United Nations became the Palestinian 
refugees, for whom it managed to raise Western aid.  This has remained an unresolved 
issue to this very day. 
The paper concludes by questioning the impact that Egypt’s impartial policy has on its 
capacity to pursue its quest for self-determination as a human right. 
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II. The Aftermath of World War II 
    A. Egyptian Foreign Policy in 1945 
In order to be able to understand the attitude chosen by Egypt to try and curb the 
influence of the major powers while it participated in the drafting of the Charter of the 
United Nations, and also to understand its consequent defense of smaller nations, it is 
worth looking back at Egypt’s foreign policy at the time, in its proper political context. 
Like in the rest of the world, there was turmoil in Egypt at the end of World War II.  
Britain had tightened its grip on Egypt in order to ensure its solidarity during the war, and 
this was not to please the Egyptian nationalists.  In fact, since the First World War, 
American President Woodrow Wilson’s “formulating a postwar order based on ‘self-
determination,’ . . . revolutionized Egyptian political expectations.”9  The nationalist 
sentiments were instilled in both the Left wing and the Wafd party, which eventually 
imposed itself as the dominant political party starting the 1920s till the revolution of 
1952.10 What both these parties had in common was the wish to oust the British from 
Egypt.  In 1936, an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed which aroused the nationalists’ 
anger, as it helped the British maintain many interests in Egypt.11
                                                             
9 Eran Lerman, A Revolution Prefigured: Foreign Policy Orientations in the Postwar Years, in EGYPT 
FROM MONARCHY TO REPUBLIC A REASSESSMENT OF REVOLUTION AND CHANGE 283, 284-285 (Shimon Shamir 
ed., Westview Press, 1995). 
  With World War II, 
while Egypt aspired to independence, the British held onto Egypt even tighter than 
before. 
10 See TAREK HEGGY, CULTURE, CIVILIZATION AND HUMANITY 375, n.51 (Frank Cass, 2003). 
11 J. C. HUREWITZ, MIDDLE-EAST DILEMMAS, THE BACKGROUND OF THE UNITED STATES POLICY 75 (Harper & 
Brothers, New York, 1953). 
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The world scene explains Britain’s holding onto Egypt: during the war, the Allied 
powers tried to “befriend” all those who were either anti-Axis or neutral, in order to 
reinforce their military position; this accounts for inviting the smaller nations to the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco.12 Moreover, 
at the outcome of the war, there was a redistribution of land amongst the victorious 
powers, and the Allies were divided, giving birth to the Cold War.  Britain – eventually 
sustained by the USA coming up as one of the two poles of the rising Cold War – feared 
it would lose its “partisans” to the other pole, the USSR, who overtly proclaimed an anti-
imperialist policy.13
As a result of post World War II world scene, Egypt, even though barely militarily 
active in the War, found itself a partisan in a European war shattering the West, and of no 
concern to it at all;
 
14  it first cut its relations with Germany, then with Vichy France.15  
Yet, its government’s ententes with Britain were far from satisfactory to the nationalists 
who wanted complete independence of their territory.  In fact, Ismail Sidqi Pasha, Egypt’s 
Prime Minister, while negotiating with the British to end the 1936 Treaty, signed a 
protocol known as the Bevin-Sidqi Agreement which, according to British interpretation 
allowed Britain to share the administration of the Sudan with Egypt, and according to 
Sidqi Pasha brought the Sudan back to Egypt.16
                                                             
12 See RUTH B. RUSSELL & JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE 
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945 537 (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1958). See also 
Alfred J. Hotz, 336 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 127, 128 (1961).  
 The nationalists were outraged at the 
13 MICHAEL DORAN, PAN-ARABISM BEFORE NASSER EGYPTIAN POWER POLITICS AND THE PALESTINE QUESTION 23-24 
(Oxford University Press, 1999).  See also id. at 19. 
14 Supra note 11. 
15 See id. at 77-79. 
16 See supra note 13, at 9-12. 
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mere concept of an alliance with the British in administering the territory of the Sudan.17
One of the means to oust the British was to adopt neutrality and non-partisanship with 
the colonial power and its allies, a tendency which had developed as the anti-British-
colonialist sentiment increased.  It also had kept Egypt from entering the war on the side 
of Britain until just a few weeks before it ended.
 
Consequently, the Egyptian government was compelled to work on all possible means to 
achieve its central aim of ousting the British from the country. 
18 After the war, “[t]he shift towards 
neutralism and the tightening of relations with the Soviet bloc was mainly a tactical move 
– a means to pressure the West and also a mode of revenge.”19
Another means for Egypt to rid itself from British influence was to call on the support 
of the United States, the patron of self-determination, at a time when the Cold War 
imposed on the US and the USSR tactful diplomacy with smaller states and potential 
allies,
 
20
A third means to get rid of the British was the formation of an Arab bloc which would 
strengthen the status of this group of states headed by Egypt. On March 22nd, 1945 the 
Arab League Pact was signed in Cairo; its first Secretary-General was Egyptian.
 in order to strengthen their respective camps in the conflict. 
21
                                                             
17 Id. at 11. 
 As 
Adly Andraos expressed it, “[f]rom now onwards, in the diplomatic field, if no other, 
Egypt’s voice would not be alone.  And indeed the echo has gone ever more resounding 
18 Id. at 76. 
19 Rami Ginat, The Egyptian Left and the Roots of Neutralism in the Pre-Nasserite Era, 30 BRIT. J. INT’L L. 
5, 23 (2003). 
20 See supra note 13, at 23-33. 
21 See supra note 11, at 79-80. 
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then… The first occasion to express this solidarity was the Conference of San 
Francisco… to draft the Charter of the United Nations.”22
It is against this background of Egypt’s political situation that we need to approach its 
position on the question of self-determination. 
 
 
B. The Concept of Self-Determination 
It is important here to mention that the concept of “self-determination” did not always 
mean the same to everyone and along the years.  In the late 1910s, for instance, the 
meaning was different for the Russian leader Lenin than for American President Wilson.  
While the former had a totally anti-colonialist perspective, the latter aimed at offering 
peoples the right to choose their ruler without exterminating colonialism. “Wilson did not 
envision self-determination as giving rise to a right to wage violent revolutions. Whereas 
Lenin called for the immediate liberation of those living under colonial rule, Wilson 
championed ‘orderly liberal reformism.’”23
The differences continued till the Second World War.  In spite of Britain’s and the 
USA’s proclamation that self-determination would become a basic standard after the War, 
the British Prime Minister clearly stated that self-determination did not touch the 
colonies.
 
24
                                                             
22 ADLY ANDRAOS, The International Status of Egypt During the Last Half Century, SOCIÉTÉ 
D’ÉCONOMIE POLITIQUE, DE STATISTIQUE ET DE LÉGISLATION 1, 14, (Société Orientale de Publicité, 
1960). 
 The debates over the significance of the term while drafting the Charter of the 
United Nations ended in an understanding that “self-determination” was a means to the 
23ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 21 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995). 
24 Id. at 37.  
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end of establishing good relations between nations, with equal rights, and the common 
goal of achieving self-government.25
As the USSR grew more powerful, however, both the socialist bloc and the developing 
nations adopted a more aggressive conception of self determination, one that was 
radically anti-colonialist. By 1955, after the Bandung Conference of the non-aligned 
states, this became the dominant concept.
 Appropriate mechanisms, such as the trusteeship 
system, were established to help the political development of the non-self-governing 
nations towards their independence. 
26
Being invited to the United Nations Conference on International Organization was an 
outstanding opportunity for Egypt, then, to get closer to the decision makers of the world 
order.  The invitation was extended on March 5, 1945 by the victorious powers of World 
War II, and it enabled small nations to state their opinions in drafting the Charter of the 
United Nations.
  The evolution of Egypt’s approach towards 
self-determination went along the same line, as will be shown below. 
27
Egypt, as a nation avid for its independence and holding it as its primary goal, 
welcomed the invitation as a means of salvation.  Drafting the Charter of the UN was 
going to give Egypt the opportunity to participate in setting international standards that 
would reinforce it in its struggle for independence from British colonialism. 
 
The coming chapter will relate Egypt’s role in drafting the Charter, and how it 
developed its own policy regarding impartiality and self-determination. 
                                                             
25 Id. at 42. 
26 Id. at 44. 
27 See generally George A. Finch, The United Nations Charter, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (1945). 
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III. Egypt and the United Nations 
The present chapter will explore Egypt’s activities at the United Nations.  First 
participating in drafting the Charter, it was subsequently elected in different committees 
of the General Assembly of the UN, and also participated in drafting the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
 
A. The Beginning: The Charter of the United Nations 
San Francisco, June 26, 1945: the beginning of a new era. Fifty nations attended the 
United Nations Conference on International Organization; fifty states signed the Charter 
of the United Nations, thus marking the cloture of the conference, and the creation, four 
months later, of the United Nations.  Among these fifty nations, Egypt was invited as a 
nation which had sided with the Allies in World War II.28
The United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and China had convened in 1944 at 
Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., and discussed proposals which eventually became 
the basis on which the UN Charter was founded. 
 
29 The purpose of drafting the Charter 
was to ensure peace, human rights “in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,”30
                                                             
28 See RUTH B. RUSSELL & JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE 
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945 506-509 (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1958).  
 justice and social 
29 Id., at 411. 
30 U.N. Charter pmbl. § 1, para. 2. 
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progress. The signatory states agreed to establish an international organization working 
for these ends, of which the Charter would be the establishing instrument.31
During the debates that took place in San Francisco to adapt the Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals to the new organization, Egypt did not remain idle.  Its participation came 
through discussions concerning several articles, all of which reflect a tendency to hold 
onto the enforcement of justice and international law, expressed in the promotion of 
weaker states, as well as maximal protection for non-self-governing nations.  Together 
with other nations, Egypt pushed for many proposals against racial discrimination; with 
others, it also “kept up the pressure for giving human rights an even higher profile in the 
Charter.”
 
32
In his article Présence de l’Egypte, Adly Andraos praised the activities of the Egyptian 
Delegation: 
 
The Egyptian Delegation contributed to the works from which the Charter of 
the United Nations was to come out, in such a distinguished manner, that this 
Country whose degree of Sovereignty some still pretended to measure, took 
right away a place among the six first members elected to the Security 
Council, while an Egyptian Jurisconsult was called to sit as Judge at the 
International Court of the Hague.33
 
     The first of Egypt’s interventions came while drafting what was to become Article 
1(1) of the Charter concerning maintenance of peace and security. At Dumbarton Oaks, 
the proposals targeted “peace at any price for the small nations.  Reference to the 
 
                                                             
31 U.N. Charter art. 1. 
32 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 13& 17 respectively (Random House, New York, 2001). 
33 ADLY Y. ANDRAOS, Présence de l’Egypte [Egypt’s Presence], LA REVUE D’ATHENES 3, 4 (Dec., 1950). 
14 
 
principles of international law and justice were conspicuous by their absence.”34 Several 
nations objected to that, and an amendment was made to include “due regard for 
principles of justice and international law” in the settlement of disputes.35  This 
amendment, however, guaranteed no such standards regarding the enforcement of peace 
and security.  In spite of the protests of the United States and Britain, the smaller nations 
kept asking for the inclusion of this guarantee, “Egypt raising the point again in the 
commission, when the committee text was up for adoption.”36
In another instance, the delegates of the different nations failed to define the word 
“aggression” found in Article 1 (1) and Chapter VII.  The problem with this is that action 
taken against aggression in order to safeguard peace could actually be taken unjustly, 
since “aggression” could be interpreted in different ways.  Fearing these consequences, 
Egypt joined Bolivia, Brazil, Ethiopia and Peru in submitting amendments ensuring that 
member states of the new organization would not breach each others’ territorial integrity 
and independence – Article 2 (4).
  Eventually, article 1 (1) 
was adopted with the amendment. 
37  This was only one aspect of Egypt’s concern for 
neutralizing the influence of the Great Powers, since at an ulterior moment, it pushed for 
further strengthening of smaller vulnerable nations by calling for greater autonomy for 
regional organizations.38 It is hardly surprising, then, that Egypt requested that the Arab 
League be considered a regional system within the new organization, complying with 
articles 52 and 53 of the Charter.39
                                                             
34 Supra note 27, at 542. 
 The point to note here, however, and which will be 
35 See supra note 28, at 656.  
36 Id at 657. 
37 See id. at 673. 
38 See id. at 688. 
39 See id. at 704. 
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discussed below, is that it was an Egyptian move rather than that of any other Arab 
country represented, namely Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, or Syria.40
An additional evidence of Egypt’s caring for weaker nations’ interests is its insistence, 
together with the Philippines and Iraq, on referring to the nations which would be under 
the trusteeship system as developing towards “self-determination”.
 
41  Alternative terms 
namely “independence” and “self-government” were eventually used.42
Egypt was also responsible for bringing up the provisions of articles 82 and 83 of the 
Charter concerning trusteeship and the Security Council’s assistance to the Trusteeship 
Council, although both its attempts to add clauses allowing for peoples to select their 
trustee administration, and to diminish the power of the trustee’s authority by 
empowering the Security Council were rejected.
 
43  Egypt further proposed an amendment 
empowering the General Assembly to control the trusteeship in case of violation of its 
terms.44 “The committee, Egypt argued, should remember how powerless the League of 
Nations had been when Japan violated mandate restrictions and withdrew from the 
organization.”45
Egypt’s amendment proposals were not always adopted.  Besides being a small nation, 
there were 3,500 persons also attending the Conference, all allowed to bring up their 
concerns, leading to too many proposals.
 
46
                                                             
40 See United Nations Member States, available at http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml. 
 Yet, one can tell from all the above that Egypt 
41 Supra note 28, at 817. 
42 U.N. Charter art. 76, para. b. See also supra note 28, at 816-817. 
43 See supra note 28, at 834-837. See also id. at 836 n.47-48 
44 The General Assembly was established by art. 20 of the U.N. Charter. See infra note 48. 
45 Supra note 28, at 837. 
46 The Story of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945, UN CHRONICLE, April, 
1985, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_v22/ai_3709367. 
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was specifically noted for constantly attempting to downsize the influence of the Big 
Powers over the small nations.  Eventually, these small nations achieved an aim namely 
that “the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council were given wider 
authority than was provided for in the Dumbarton Oaks draft, and they were made 
principal organs of the UN.”47
Egypt was thus keen on having a Charter well equipped with provisions which it would 
later use as a weapon to safeguard its own self-determination, and continue struggling for 
the other nations’ in the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
 
 
B. The First General Assembly 
In addition to participating in drafting the UN Charter, Egypt was also active in the UN 
General Assembly.  The General Assembly is one of the six main organs of the United 
Nations; it was established by the Charter and it meets on an annual basis to discuss 
diverse issues, with the guidance of the Charter.48
                                                             
47The Making of the United Nations, the San Francisco Conference, 25 April–26 June 1945, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS, available at http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-
Nations/The-Making-of-the-United-Nations-THE-SAN-FRANCISCO-CONFERENCE-25-APRIL-26-
JUNE-1945.html. 
 At its very first meeting in London in 
January 1946, an Egyptian judge was chosen for a three year term at both the Security 
Council established by Article 7 (1) of the Charter, and the International Court of Justice 
established by Chapter XIV of the Charter; namely, Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha, who 
48 U.N. Charter chapt. IV. 
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was also the head of the Egyptian Delegation to the General Assembly for the same 
years.49
The First General Assembly created six committees which would study resolutions to 
be presented to, and eventually either adopted or rejected by the General Assembly.
 
50
1. The Political and Security Committee (First Committee). 
  
These committees were: 
2. The Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee). 
3. The Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee). 
4. The Trusteeship Committee (Fourth Committee). 
5. The Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee). 
6. The Legal Committee (Sixth Committee). 
Egypt assumed an important role from the very first General Assembly.  It was elected 
as a member of the First Committee for a one-year term by 45 votes out of 51; the 
committee was to look into admission of new member states, into the issue of article 27 
on the voting system at the Security Council, and more particularly the question of 
whether to adopt the veto or not.51  It is to be noted, as reminded by Adly Andraos, that 
Egypt insisted on the inclusion of the veto in the Charter,52 “restricting the competences 
granted to countries by the veto power,”53
                                                             
49 See The General Assembly, 1 INT”L ORG. 46, 47 (Feb. 1947).  See also supra note 22 at14. See also supra 
note 33 at 4.   
  by “broadening the powers of the General 
50 The General Assembly, 1 INT”L ORG. 46, 46 (Feb. 1947). 
51 Id. at 22. 
52 UN GAOR AD HOC POLITICAL COMMITTEE, 3rd Sess., 21st plen. mtg. at  8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.24/SR 
21 ( Dec. 4, 1948). 
53 Egypt State Information Service, 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Foreign/IntlOrganizations/EgyptUN/040313010000000001.htm 
18 
 
Assembly.”54 The Committee was also to consider the issue of reduction of armament, 
and the relationship between Franco’s Spain and the United Nations. The government of 
Spain was considered by the majority of the members of the General Assembly to have 
been “established with Axis support, and consequently was not qualified for membership 
in the United Nations.”55 Egypt, as will be shown below, did not follow the line of the 
majority, and kept its own policy with regards to Spain.56
Egypt was moreover elected as a member of the Fourth Committee, the first mission of 
which was to study trusteeship agreement proposals for eight mandates under the 
trusteeship system. “The territories and the trustee States were as follows: New Guinea 
(Australia), Raunda-Urundi [sic] (Belgium), Cameroons and Togoland (France), Western 
Samoa (New Zealand), Tanganyika, Cameroons and Togoland (United Kingdom).”
 
57 All 
eight mandates were approved, as states like Egypt pushed to move non-self-governing 
nations from the colonized status to that of being under the trusteeship system, which 
administers their development towards the achievement of self-determination.58
Upon dealing with the issue of the “non-self-governing” nations, however, debates 
ensued over the meaning and content of article 73 (e) of the Charter,
 
59
                                                             
54 Supra note 22, at 15. 
 which if left un-
55 Supra note 50, at 47. 
56 This issue of the relations between Spain and the UN is discussed below, see chapter V A. 
57 Supra note 50, at 66. 
58 Egyptian Delegation to the UN Fourth Committee Trusteeship Council, Report on the First Session (26 
March-28 April 1947) (my translation) (on file with author). 
59 “Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of 
territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle 
that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the 
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by 
the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:… 
    e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as 
security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical 
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clarified would give much leeway to the administrators of non-self-governing territories.  
The Fourth Committee therefore established an ad hoc committee to negotiate that article; 
Egypt was again a member of this committee. 
 
     1. The debates on Article 73 (e): the “ad hoc” committee of the Fourth Committee 
Article 73 (e) was a tool to control the influence of the administrative powers over the 
non-self-governing territories.  Consequently, while colonial powers wished to minimize 
the report requirements that the article provided for, the small nations – including Egypt – 
wanted to maximize them.  The report which the Egyptian members of the Fourth 
Committee submitted to the head of their delegation on the preparatory works of the ad 
hoc committee indicates that the ad hoc committee was divided into two camps.  The first 
one was represented by China, Egypt, the Philippines, and the Soviet Union.  The second 
one included Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and Uruguay.  The second camp objected to the trustee’s report 
including information concerning the political development of the peoples of the non-
self-governing territories within the information to be reported to the Secretary-General; 
the camp considered such information to be outside the scope of work of the committee, 
on top of it being impossible to reach an agreement on the nature of this kind of 
information.  The first camp, on the other hand, found it important to include this kind of 
information.  Egypt in particular saw that information on political development could not 
be differentiated or separated from economic, social, and educational conditions; the 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are 
respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.” 
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Egyptian delegate questioned how the political development – essential for the march 
towards the independence of these territories – could be supervised by the United Nations 
organization if the latter did not have adequate reports about the territories.   The rest of 
its camp shared this opinion.  The final decision on which there was a consensus was the 
optional submission of the information in question.60
The Egyptian delegate was also the first one to point out that there should be a 
unanimous understanding of the nature of the information to be submitted by the 
committee to the Secretary-General, in order to enable him to make adequate 
comparisons between the developments of the different non-self-governing territories.  
The delegate proposed setting up a questionnaire for this end; his proposal was approved 
unanimously. He further asked for reports including on mandatory basis ample and exact 
information on the policies followed by the different trustee states with regard to the 
maintenance and respect of the identity and civilization of the respective peoples, the 
preservation of their languages and the promotion of their education and standard of 
living.
 
61
Finally, it was thanks to Egypt that interest was given to the information provided by 
non-governmental organizations. The Egyptian delegate pointed out that such 
organizations made scientific studies devoid of propaganda or bias, and that this would be 
advantageous to the nations under the trusteeship system.  Resolution 4 (1) of 14 
February 1946 recommended the inclusion of non-governmental organizations’ help to 
the Economic and Social Committee of the General Assembly. 
 
                                                             
60 See generally The Ad Hoc Committee, Report on the Work of the Committee on Information from Non-
Self-Governing Territories, (September, 1947) (on file with author) (my translation). 
61 Id. 
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     2. First report of the Egyptian delegation to the Fourth Committee62
More on Egypt’s position as supporting non-self-governing nations at the General 
Assembly in 1946 is reflected in the report which the Egyptian delegation to the first 
session of the Fourth Committee submitted to the Egyptian Delegation to the second 
session.  The report reflects annoyance on behalf of the Egyptian representatives.  
According to this report, several states showed only little interest in the discussions 
concerning non-self-governing territories.  The different political interests divided the 
member states into two: the “colonizers” who chanted the praises of the colonial system, 
and the anti-colonialists – led by the USSR – who claimed that colonialism was a form of 
inhuman exploitation.  It is interesting to learn from the report that the United States who 
was once a fervent advocate of “self-determination”,
 
63
As to Egypt, the report said, it gave special care to its work in the Trusteeship 
Committee because “it has suffered greatly from the ills of foreign influence.”
 though rather moderate in the ad 
hoc committee debating article 73 (e), showed more inclination towards the colonialists, 
or in other words, opposed the USSR. Clearly, the air of the Cold War was blowing. 
64
                                                             
62 Taha el-Sayed Nasr, Report on the Work of the Fourth Committee Second Session (1947) (on file with 
author) (my translation). 
 
Consequently, Egypt was adamant in helping the non-self-governing nations to attain 
freedom and independence.  It sided with the anti colonial bloc, the USSR, because it 
63 See supra note 23, at 14-33. 
64 Supra note 62. at 4. 
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“agrees with anyone who opposes the idea of colonialism, and because it knows perfectly 
that much of what is said in defense of colonialism is completely devoid of truth.”65
The Egyptian delegates to both the ad hoc and the Fourth committees were therefore 
convinced that it was their duty to stand by the small nations, defend the peoples of non-
self-governing territories, and be allies in any action to promote the supervision of the 
United Nations Organization.
 
66  This is shown through Egypt’s successes, in coalition 
with the other small nations in the ad hoc committee, in changing several decisions in 
favor of the nations under the trusteeship system, thus defeating the colonialist point of 
view.67
In a reference to the Arab nations, the report says that they were all in total agreement 
with each other during the reported session of the Fourth Committee, but that the situation 
was not the same when discussions reached the General Assembly: while Egypt voted for 
the Fourth Committee’s decisions, the Arabs abstained from doing so,
 
68
The final remarks of the report let one perceive a growing sense of Egyptian leadership 
as they express Egypt’s concern with African nations, as well as with the Arabs, stating 
that 
 which indicates 
that Egypt had a consistent position fearless of western pressure. 
it is necessary, considering that Egypt is an African state, that it pays interest 
to the affairs of the African nations who do not enjoy independence, and that 
it guides them in an open policy in this direction… Egypt’s position, its 
                                                             
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See supra chapt. III § B 1. 
68 Supra note 62, at 5. 
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leadership of the Arab bloc, and its importance in the African continent, 
impose on it to have a guiding role in the Trusteeship Committee.69
 
     Thus, one can say at this point that at the First General Assembly, its committees and 
sub-committees, Egypt pushed for the interest of the peoples of the non-self-governing 
territories, with the concept that these peoples should develop in different aspects under 
trusteeship until their development drives them towards self-determination – a concept 
which, as mentioned above, tends to conform to the Western vision of self-determination. 
 
The final remark of the report mentioned above also reflects that Egypt started to see 
itself as a leader, concerned not only with colonized states, but with the smaller African 
and Arab nations in general, even though the Arabs did not align with Egypt in the voting 
at the General Assembly as mentioned above.  With this new stand, Egypt joined in 
drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the following year. 
 
C. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
It was during the first General Assembly that a resolution was taken to write drafts on 
the rights and duties of States, and an international bill of fundamental rights and 
freedoms – which was later to become in part the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), also known as General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 
1948.70
                                                             
69 Id. at 10. 
 The UDHR was drafted by the Commission on Human Rights, established by the 
Economic and Social Council in June 1946; the Commission was composed of 18 states, 
including Egypt. 
70 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
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Egypt’s membership in the Commission on Human Rights was for a period of three 
years. In her account on the drafting of UDHR, Mary Ann Glendon wrote that when the 
members of the Commission met for the first time in January 1947, they were given the 
charge not only of drafting a bill of rights, but also of “devising means for its 
implementation.” 71  Considering the difficulty in having eighteen nations working on the 
same issue, the Commission was divided into three working groups: the first one drafted 
the declaration – this group was headed by President Roosevelt’s widow, Eleanor, who 
championed the procedures till the adoption of the UDHR; the second group worked on a 
“draft Convention” to be able to legally enforce the declaration – Egypt, represented by 
Mr. Omar Loutfi, was part of this group; and finally, the third group was to work on 
means to implement the Declaration-to-be.72 The three groups were each composed of 
representatives of a diverse group of countries, with the purpose of achieving a truly 
universal document, covering rights for peoples of all sorts of nations; “the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights represented a common statement of goals and aspirations -- 
a vision of the world as the international community would want it to become.”73
It is worth noting that during the 183rd plenary session which witnessed the Third 
Committee’s discussions on the draft UDHR, and while the tension of the Cold War 
increased between the Eastern bloc and the West, Egypt did not side with the USSR as it 
had done during the draft of the Charter, or as it was later written by Charles Malik, the 
Lebanese representative and Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, when he 
described the atmosphere of the Commission: “There had been, Malik wrote, a ‘quiet 
 
                                                             
71 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (Random House, New York, 2001). 
72 Id. at 87. 
73The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Magna Carta for all Humanity, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm 
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revolution’ in the Human Rights Commission since the adoption of the Declaration, a 
revolution reflecting the hardening of the division between ‘two more or less solid blocs’ 
— one Soviet-led and composed of the Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia, Chile, Uruguay, 
Pakistan, and Egypt [emphasis added]; the other U.S.-led and composed of the United 
Kingdom, France, Australia, Belgium, Sweden, Greece, and Nationalist China. Malik 
described his own country and India as unaligned but voting ‘for the most part’ with the 
Soviet bloc.”74
In fact, Egypt’s shift in position showed during the 183rd Plenary Session while drafting 
the UDHR, when the USSR proposed the four following amendments:
 Egypt, then, was starting to shift from the pro-Eastern bloc just to be anti-
colonial as it was mentioned before to having a place of its own in the middle. 
75
1.   Article 3 of the draft: Originally, the delegate of the USSR wanted to amend the 
article which according to him did not go far enough as to give the nations the 
right to self-determination. It merely proclaimed rights to the peoples of the 
trusteeship system and non-self governing territories. The proposal was rejected 
by 34 votes to 8, with 14 abstainers – Egypt abstained from voting.  Article 3 was 
eventually deleted and replaced by article 2 (2) as per an approved proposal made 
by the United Kingdom. 
 
2.   Article 20 of the draft:76
                                                             
74 Supra note 71, at 207. 
 The article protects the right of everyone’s freedom to 
express and propagate his democratic views. The USSR’s proposal aimed at 
setting limits on fascist propaganda - which was considered by the USSR to be a 
75 U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 183rd plen. mtg.  at 926-933, U.N. Doc. A/777 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
76 Subsequently became article 19 after article 3 was deleted. 
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crime - rather than giving absolute freedom of dissemination. The proposal was 
rejected by 41 votes to 9 with 9 abstainers – Egypt voted against. 
3.   Article 22 of the draft:77
4.   Article 30 of the draft: The USSR proposed to add to this last article of the UDHR 
a new one stating that the rights and freedoms proclaimed by the Declaration 
should be guaranteed by State laws. The proposal was rejected by 32 votes to 10 
with 14 abstainers – Egypt abstained from voting. 
 The representative of the USSR found that the article 
guaranteeing every person’s right to participate in the government of his/her 
country insufficient; he wanted to add the right to elect and be elected, by 
universal, secret suffrage as well as direct suffrage; he also wanted to add the right 
to access State and public offices. The proposal was rejected by 36 votes to 9 with 
11 abstainers – Egypt abstained from voting. 
The West, i.e. the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France…, 
systematically voted against the USSR’s amendment proposals, which were only 
supported by the few members of the Eastern bloc.  Egypt, I believe, must have been in 
an embarrassing situation considering its position against the colonial system and its 
relationship with the West. It only voted once, and that was to reject setting limits on the 
freedom of democratic expression.  The West was accusing the USSR of subordinating 
the individual to the State, thus jeopardizing the entire meaning and purpose of the 
UDHR.  The USSR’s reply to this was that such an argument was only applicable in 
countries where the individual’s interests and those of the State were competing due to 
the differences in social classes – but that in a society where there were no different social 
                                                             
77 Subsequently became article 21 after article 3 was deleted. 
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classes, the interest of the individual naturally matched that of the State, and 
subordination would be equally natural, if not desirable. The fact that Egypt voted only 
once means that it chose to follow neither camp, but that it was firm on the rights and 
freedoms which it voted to protect.  The result, nevertheless was that all four amendments 
were rejected, which led the USSR and seven other nations to abstain from voting for the 
adoption of the UDHR.78
Prior to the adoption, which occurred during the same session, Mr. Wahid Raafat, 
speaking for Egypt, expressed concerns over two issues in the UDHR-to-be, namely 
articles 17 and 19 of the draft.
 
79  The first one established equality in marriage between 
men and women, simultaneously eliminating the restrictions put on marriage concerning 
race, nationality, and religion.  To this, the Egyptian representative explained that religion 
in Egypt and in most of the Muslim countries imposed restrictions on women, disallowing 
them from marrying men with different religious beliefs.  Raafat stressed, however, that 
the religious nature of these restrictions rendered them acceptable to the human mind, 
unlike the “shocking” restrictions based on such reasons as skin color.80
As to article 19, which established freedom of “thought, conscience and religion” 
including the liberty for one to change his/her religion, Mr. Raafat assured that Egypt 
would have had no objections whatsoever had the article stopped at the first part; freedom 
to change religion, however, put a light note on the meaning of religion, and would 
encourage disliked practices such as changing religion for divorce purposes; it would also 
allow, he explained, for “the machination of certain missions” whose aim to convert the 
 
                                                             
78 The other abstainers were Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, 
Ukrainian Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. See supra note 75, at 933. 
79 These articles were to become article 16 and 18 respectively in the declaration adopted in Dec., 1948. 
80 Supra note 75, at 912. 
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people of the “Orient” to their own beliefs was well known.81 Yet Egypt did not hesitate 
to vote for the adoption of the Declaration, after expressing the wish to make it clear that 
the new social and economic rights provided for would be acquired gradually, and 
according to the economic status and resources of the respective States.  With India, 
Egypt asked for the socio-economic rights of the peoples to be also promoted by 
institutions other than the State.82
As mentioned earlier, the Cold War was beginning to divide the “United” Nations.  
Moreover, Egypt had sent armies to Palestine in the month of May preceding the adoption 
of the Declaration, prepared to engage in a war against establishing the State of Israel.  
But in spite of this atmosphere, Egypt and the other small nations played a considerable 
and influential role in framing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
 
83
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
81 Id. at 913. 
82 Supra note 71, at 107-116. 
83 Id. at 225. 
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IV. Some Issues on the Agenda of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations 
Egypt’s membership in the Fourth Committee of the United Nations highlights its 
commitment to the self-determination of peoples.  It will be recalled that the Fourth 
Committee (the Trusteeship Committee) was established during the first General 
Assembly in London, as one of the six bodies of the General Assembly.  The role of the 
Committee was to deal with questions related to the administration of the territories under 
the trusteeship system.  The purpose of the latter was to promote the development of the 
Trust Territories in every respect “towards self-government or independence.”84
After its election as a member of the Fourth Committee in 1946, Egypt was re-elected 
in 1947.  The examples given hereafter of the issues handled by the Committee, show 
Egypt’s perseverance in defending weaker nations and advocating justice and human 
rights. 
 
 
A. The Question of South West Africa: Egypt and the African Cause 
Egypt’s interest in the South West African cause reflects its concern for the self-
determination of African nations.  Egypt played an important role to help these nations 
acquire their independence as will be shown hereafter in the case of South West Africa, 
which is today known as Namibia. 
                                                             
84 Trusteeship Council, http://www.un.org/documents/tc.htm. 
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     1. Historical background of South West Africa 
South West Africa was a German colony until South Africa, part of the British 
Commonwealth, occupied it in 1915; in 1926, the League of Nations gave South Africa a 
Mandate over the former German South West Africa.85 Although the region was 
prospering economically, all its wealth went to the white people, and there reigned strong 
racial discrimination.86
 
    2. Under the auspices of the Fourth Committee 
 When the League of Nations was dissolved, its successor, the 
United Nations organization, was to follow up on the Mandate system. 
According to Article 77 (1) (a) (Chapter XII) of the U.N. Charter stipulates that 
territories under mandate are liable to the Trusteeship system established by the 
organization.  Trusteeship was thus applicable to South West Africa which was under the 
mandatory power of South Africa.  The Union of South Africa, however, refused to let 
the territory, which was by then considered to be South Africa’s “fifth province,”87
                                                             
85 Country Info, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations, 
http://www.un.int/namibia/ See also History World, History of Namibia, 
 begin 
its process towards independence.  The debates in the Trusteeship Committee started as 
early as 1946, during the First General Assembly.  The representative of the government 
of South Africa claimed that the people of South West Africa desired that their territory 
be incorporated into the Union of South Africa, but he promised, nevertheless, that the 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid =ad32.df5. 
86 History World, History of Namibia, 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid =ad32.df5. 
87 South Africa was then divided in four provinces (Cape, Natal, Orange, Transvaal).  See LAROUSSE MÉMO 
ENCYCLOPÉDIE EN 1 VOLUME 745-746 (2nd ed. 2002) (my translation).   
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incorporation would not occur, and that the territory would be administered according to 
the mandate system of the League of Nations (the United Nations’ predecessor) until the 
matter was resolved.  Some delegations’ members questioned the possibility of knowing 
the opinion of the South West African people by democratic methods, and the General 
Assembly considered that the people of South West Africa had not yet reached the level 
of political development which would allow their independence. Since the idea of 
incorporation could not be accepted, the General Assembly recommended by resolution 
65 (1) of 14 December 1946, that the territory of South West Africa be placed under the 
Trusteeship System.88
In 1947, the Fourth Committee resumed its activities, with the Union of South Africa 
maintaining its position in spite of the General Assembly’s recommendations.  The Union 
insisted that it was under no legal obligation to bring the territory in question under 
trusteeship, and that it would continue to administer it without incorporation, while 
submitting to the U.N. annual reports complying with Article 73 (e) of the Charter.  Even 
though a group of Member States expressed relief at the Union not incorporating South 
West Africa, another group was not satisfied.  Egypt was part of the latter group.  It found 
that South Africa was under legal and moral obligation to propose a trusteeship 
agreement for this territory, and that all territories in mandate should be placed under the 
trusteeship system, as per Chapter XII of the Charter. 
 
The Egyptian delegate to the Trusteeship Committee drew the attention of the members 
to the fact that the same issues had fully been discussed in the previous session of the 
General Assembly, and that the Assembly had adopted a resolution.  Any further 
                                                             
88 G.A. Res. 65 (I) Future Status of South West Africa (Dec. 14, 1946). See also supra note 50, at 69-70. 
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arguments should therefore be seen as deflecting the attention from a core problem, which 
was that a Member State had ignored a resolution of the General Assembly.89  The 
delegate further said that such behavior discredited the organization of the United 
Nations; he reminded the Committee that the League of Nations failed because of such 
attitudes.90  To the Egyptian delegate, there were therefore two points to the same 
question; the first one being that South Africa did not abide by the General Assembly’s 
recommendations, and the second that the Trusteeship Committee was to examine the 
reports submitted by South Africa regarding the territory in question.91  Egypt thus 
wanted the United Nations to maintain a firm position that would guarantee the eventual 
self-determination of non-self-governed territories, from fear of letting the mandatory 
powers reaffirm their authority on these territories.  Resolution 141 (II) of 1 November 
1947 was eventually adopted, maintaining the recommendation to put South West Africa 
under Trusteeship, and authorizing the Trusteeship Committee to review the reports.92  
While the attitude of the government of South Africa remained the same though 1948, the 
fourth session of the General Assembly in 1949 witnessed further deterioration when the 
South African representative expressed his government’s wish to “discontinue supplying 
information on the administration of the territory.”93
After long debates, the Committee granted a hearing to Reverend Michael Scott as 
unofficial representative for South West African tribes.  A subcommittee including a 
representative of Egypt was formed to consider the hearing.  Reverend Scott spoke in the 
name of the tribes who had no possibility to voice their thoughts.  He accused the 
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93 General Assembly, 4 INT”L ORG. 59, 101 (Feb., 1950). 
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government of the Union of South Africa of “oppressive policies of racial discrimination 
in South West Africa,” and asked the Committee to consider granting a hearing to the 
official representatives of the tribes who had requested their territory to be placed under 
the trusteeship system.94 In November 1951, a joint proposal submitted by Egypt and 
other states to grant hearing to the representatives of the South West African Tribes was 
accepted.95  In the following session, Egypt joined other Members in presenting two 
drafts condemning the Union and insisting on applying Chapter XII on the territory of 
South West Africa.96  Both drafts were adopted as Resolution 570 (VI) of 19 January 
1952.97  But the representatives of the tribes who were granted the hearing were never 
allowed to reach France, where the General Assembly was held.  They were therefore one 
more time represented by Reverend Scott, who “had just been notified by the Union 
government that he was regarded as an undesirable inhabitant and would not be allowed 
to reenter the country.”98
Regrettably, the struggle between the U.N. and South Africa lasted until 1966 when the 
former deprived the latter from the South West African mandate, whose name changed to 
Namibia.  In 1990, it was proclaimed the independent “Republic of Namibia.”
 The Trusteeship Committee consequently voted that it would 
transmit the Committee’s reports on these meetings to the tribes, since the tribes’ officials 
could not reach France, and Reverend Scott could not get back to them. 
99
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was one of the first countries to recognize the new Namibia.  In fact, it had supported the 
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SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization) who struggled against South African 
rule, and at the United Nations, “Egypt played a pivotal role through the United Nations 
Council on Namibia.”100
 
B. Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru: Egypt and the Independence of Nations 
  In other words, Egypt did not change its policy towards South 
West Africa’s self-determination held since 1945 until it asserted independence in 1990. 
Egypt worked for nations to emerge from colonialism and move towards self-
determination through the trusteeship system.  The case of Nauru shows that Egypt sides 
impartiality neither with the East nor with the West when it comes to discussing the 
future of a non-self-governed territory.  Nauru is an island nation in the western Pacific 
Ocean.  In 1914, it was taken by Australia, subject to British control.  In the aftermath of 
the First World War, the League of Nations put Nauru under a mandate of triple 
administration by Britain, Australia and New Zealand.101  The mandate was briefly 
interrupted – for three years – by Japanese occupation during World War II, after which it 
was resumed.102
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  In September 1947, the heads of the delegations of Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand submitted a proposal for a trusteeship agreement for Nauru which was 
examined by the Trusteeship Committee in October.  The delegate of the USSR contested 
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Article 83 of the Charter.103  According to him, it was not clear in the wording of the 
proposal which states were “directly concerned.”104 He meant that it was not clear to 
which of the three states administering trusteeship over Nauru the proposal was referring.  
To that the Australian representative specified that they would be the three states 
submitting the proposal.105 As to article 83, the delegate claimed that there had been no 
agreement from the Security Council to take the military measures stated in the seventh 
article of the proposal to protect the territory of Nauru; the Australian representative’s 
reply was that Article 83 referred to “strategic areas” which Nauru was not.106  The USSR 
delegate nonetheless insisted on proposing an amendment saying that military defense 
measures should be according to article 83, i.e. like the strategic areas.107  The 
amendment was rejected.  In the report of the Fourth Committee to the head of the 
Egyptian delegation, the Egyptian representative affirms that Egypt did not vote for the 
Russian amendment, fearing that the amendment might jeopardize the entire trusteeship 
agreement proposal.108 Egypt found that there was no need for so many details when 
Nauru was one of the last mandates to be placed under the trusteeship system, a system of 
which Egypt always favored the expansion, in order to eliminate colonialism in “its old 
traditional meaning.”109
The Trusteeship Agreement for Nauru presented by Britain, Australia and New Zealand 
was approved by the General Assembly (Resolution 140 (II)). 
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So where the USSR seemed to be raising objections against the West’s proposals for 
the sake of opposing colonial powers, Egypt looked further at its ultimate goal: the 
achievement of self-determination and riddance from imperialism.  Obviously, Egypt had 
by now drawn apart from the Cold War conflict, and it fought its own battle. 
 
C.  Non-Self-Governing Territories and Trusteeship Questions: Egypt’s  
          Impartiality 
Egypt played a major role in protecting the rights of non-self-governing territories 
placed under foreign administration. Discussions concerning the administration of 
countries placed under the trusteeship system, i.e. former mandates and countries 
progressing towards independence, and non-self-governing territories, i.e. countries that 
were still not decolonized, involved several debates which did not stop at the 
interpretation of the previously mentioned article 73 (e) of the Charter.  From the moment 
these discussions started onwards, there was an obvious split: one camp, namely the 
colonial powers, tried to keep the world situation as close as possible to what it was at the 
time, with as much influence over the territories as they could have.110  The other camp, 
composed of the Soviet bloc and the smaller nations, struggled to antagonize colonialism 
and ensure these territories a path towards independence, first by expanding the 
trusteeship system, and then by controlling the power of the administrative states over 
these territories.111  The United States grew closer to the former camp.112
Accounts on the second General Assembly of the United Nations (late 1947) report that 
the smaller nations drafted a proposal which attempted to get the mandatory powers to 
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propose trusteeship agreements, for all or most of the non-self-governing territories, to 
promote them from colonialism to trusteeship.  The reaction of the colonial powers to this 
proposal is described as one of “sharp criticism”, accusing those who submitted the 
proposal of “attempt[ing] to rewrite the Charter,” and of having no confidence in the 
administration of the territories.  The proposal was not adopted, as the votes were too 
tight, 24 to 24 with one abstention,113
The opposing stands did not come any closer at the next meeting.  In his report to the 
head of the Egyptian delegation, the Egyptian representative to the Trusteeship 
Committee in 1948 expressed disappointment and concern at the fact that discussions of 
the Member States were guided by their respective political interests rather than the 
general good; the colonial powers, he said, for the second consecutive year, tried to paint 
a beautiful image of colonialism, enhancing the advantages gained by the presence of 
colonialism in the non-self-governing territories, while ignoring the exploitative and 
inhuman aspect which imposed heavy duties and immense sacrifices on the colonized 
peoples.  They even went as far as saying that these peoples were in a far better health, 
economic and educational conditions than several nations who enjoyed independence.
  but the evidence is that smaller nations, a group to 
which Egypt belonged, had started to dare the West, and the votes were close. 
114
On the other hand, the Soviet bloc took a totally opposite point of view, heavily 
attacking colonialism, and holding it responsible for all the miseries and regression 
afflicting the world then.  The reproach the Egyptian delegate writes, however, is that the 
Soviet arguments were based on writings and statistics, regardless of the origins or 
 
                                                             
113 Supra note 105, at 72-73. 
114 Egyptian Delegation to the UN Fourth Committee Trusteeship Council, Report on the Third Session, 1-2 
(Sept., 1948) (on file with author) (my translation). 
38 
 
credibility of their authors.115  This is an indication that Egypt was not a pawn, and had to 
have scientific support to trust any analysis, even if the party submitting it shared a 
common goal, in this case demising colonialism.  The end, for Egypt, did not justify the 
means.  The Egyptian delegate went on to explain that Egypt held a moderate position, 
siding with neither party, in fact rejecting the Soviet attitude while at the same time 
rejecting the views of the colonialist bloc; like the previous year, together with Denmark, 
Egypt worked on mediating between the two camps, successful on several issues.  
Bearing in mind the interest of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories, the 
Egyptian and Danish delegates also drafted a number of proposals bringing the opposed 
opinions closer to each other, all of which were approved by the Committee, and seen as 
“an important step towards promoting the peoples of these territories and moving their 
progress towards self-determination.”116
Thus, in spite of the internal clashes, the United Nations General Assembly gradually 
moved, through initiatives of a country like Egypt, towards getting control over the 
territories which were once mandated or colonized. Resolution 325 (IV) of 15 November 
1949, after a joint proposal of which Egypt was a party, significantly raised the flag of the 
United Nations over the Trust Territories,
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 and finally, Resolution 566 (VI) of 18 
January 1952, also following a joint proposal involving Egypt, invited the association of 
the Non-Self-Governing territories (an association providing information from within the 
territories) to become associate members working more closely with the Fourth 
116 Id. at 2. 
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Committee.118
Egypt throughout the period from 1945 to 1952 acted according to its beliefs in justice 
and human rights without falling into the trap of the Great Powers.  The Egyptian 
delegation to the Fourth Committee was impartial but active. The Egyptian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs provided the delegation with timely information about the respective 
territories, thus enabling the delegates to pursue their role effectively and with full 
knowledge about the world situation.
 Thus, in the interest of the non-self-governing territories, more control was 
exercised over the administrative states that would not be able to neglect the reports. 
119
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V. Some Issues on the Agenda of the First Committee of the United Nations 
The First Committee, the Political and Security Committee, was one of the six 
committees established during the first General Assembly in London.  It dealt with 
political and security issues.120
 
A. Relations between Spain and the United Nations: Egypt and Sovereignty 
 Here below, selected international disputes between 1945 
and 1952 reflect the policy of impartiality that Egypt now followed, and its continuous 
concern for sovereignty and self-determination. 
Egypt’s respect for the sovereignty of nations was evident when it maintained its 
relationship with Spain, while the United Nations had recommended against.  One of the 
very first issues discussed by the members of the Political and Security Committee 
concerned the relations with Spain.  Spain was at that time governed by General Franco’s 
pro-fascist regime. During the First General Assembly, the members of the United 
Nations had morally condemned the Spanish government.121 Yet, some delegates from 
the Eastern bloc expressed further concern regarding the impact of Spain on world 
peace.122  On 29 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 4 establishing a sub-
committee to consider Spain’s danger over international peace and security.123  The sub-
committee confirmed the reasons for the moral condemnation of Franco’s government,124
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and the Council’s Resolution 7 of 26 June 1946 was adopted.  The Security Council’s 
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decision stated in the resolution was “to keep the situation in Spain under continuous 
observation and maintain it upon the list of matters of which it is seized, in order that it 
will be at all times ready to take such measures as may become necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”125  The General Assembly endorsed these resolutions 
with one of its own, assuring “the Spanish people of their enduring sympathy and of the 
cordial welcome awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be admitted to the 
United Nations.”126 By the same token, the General Assembly recommended that all the 
Members of the United Nations recall their diplomatic missions from Spain.127
The members of the General Assembly were not unanimous, however, in their votes for 
the resolutions; some of the delegates considered that the organization was interfering in 
the internal affairs of Member States by recommending such actions; a faction of the 
Latin American countries even stated that “the Spanish problem was not within the 
jurisdiction of the United Nations.”
 
128
Egypt, maintaining its impartiality and its position towards sovereignty, refused to 
accept the “United Nations’ invitation to ‘boycott’ Franco.”
 
129 Adly Andraos, Egyptian 
representative in the Political and Security Committee in its early sessions, condemned 
banning Spain from the United Nations. He saw it as interference in a nation’s internal 
affairs that kept its people away from the international scene for many years.130
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affirmed that the principle of self-determination of peoples gave each nation the liberty to 
adopt the kind of government that it finds most suitable for its internal conditions.131
Andraos also explained in his article Présence de l’Egypte that Egypt under King 
Farouk was keen on keeping its place in the “Concert of Nations” and therefore 
broadened its diplomatic activities in the service of order and peace; it had built the first 
bridges with the Christian world since the Crusades by sending a permanent delegation to 
the Holy See, and it was that same “inspiration” which made it not only raise its 
delegation to Madrid to the rank of Embassy, but also agree with the Spanish government 
on the creation of the Institute of Islamic Studies in the Iberian Peninsula.
 
132
So while the members of the United Nations, the Allied Powers and their partisans cut 
their relations with Spain, Egypt refused to follow, out of respect for the sovereignty of 
that state and its freedom regarding its internal affairs.  One more time, Egypt’s policy 
was one of neutrality and impartiality, choosing not to make enemies, not only within the 
United Nations, but also in the broader scope, i.e. impartiality to either the bloc which 
formed the Allies, or the one which formed the Axis. 
 
 
B. Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa: Egypt’s   
      Peace-Loving Diplomacy 
Egypt rejected the discrimination brought against the Indians in South Africa, yet it 
chose to demand for their rights without holding South Africa, the violator of these rights, 
as an enemy. The issue of the treatment of the Indians in South Africa was discussed 
during the very first meeting of the Political and Security Committee. Mrs. Pandit 
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representing India complained that new discriminatory laws of land tenure in South 
Africa disfavored the interests of the Indians.  Regardless of the fact that the victims were 
of Indian origin, Mrs. Pandit accused the Union of South Africa of racial discrimination, 
a violation to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  The general discussions 
split the Committee one more time, the Western bloc favoring appealing to the Court of 
Justice for an opinion,133 which I believe would have delayed finding solutions, and the 
Eastern bloc – this time including Egypt as well as India – favoring dealing with the facts 
as presented in the discussions.134
Subsequently, the General Assembly issued Resolution 265 (III) of 14 May 1949 
inviting India and South Africa to sit for a round table discussion, with Pakistan as a third 
party.  South Africa rejected the resolution on the grounds that the matter was an internal 
one, and outside the scope of the United Nations.  South Africa ignored the resolutions of 
the General Assembly and continued applying the apartheid system, considered by the 
General Assembly as “necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination.”
 
135 Yet, 
believing in the diplomatic means of conflict settlement, Egypt was considering 
collaboration with the Union of South Africa by 1950, in spite of siding with India in the 
Political and Security Committee debates concerning the treatment of the people of Indian 
origin in the Union.136
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  Egypt was consistent in remaining impartial and not making 
enemies.  With Spain like with South Africa, it condemned the violations of the principles 
of the Charter, but it did not cut the ties with their perpetrators.  In other words, I would 
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say it respected the internal sovereignty and policy of these governments, but it voiced its 
disapproval of them. 
 
C. Greece and the Balkans: Egypt and its Mediterranean Neighbors 
Egypt as a peace loving neutral state, keen on territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
nations, tried to settle the conflict between Greece on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia on the other, through peaceful intervention.  In fact, Greece had brought a 
complaint to the United Nations in 1946, accusing its Balkan neighbors of armed 
maneuvers on its frontiers, and of aiding the anti-government communist militias, 
bringing “threat to the territorial integrity of Greece.”  The Yugoslav representative 
denied aggression and said that problems in Greece resulted from its internal policy, and 
questioned the legitimacy of the Greek government.  Upon a proposal from the USA, the 
United Nations sent an investigative committee to report on the situation.  The committee 
which had been divided into groups at the different borders reported conflicting opinions.  
One group shared the opinion of the Balkan “aggressors,” stating that Greece’s internal 
policy was the reason for the formation of revolted militias; another group confirmed 
Greece’s complaints.  The report caused violent debates at the meeting of the First 
Committee in September 1947, with the USA calling upon the Security Council to 
immediately act on stopping the aggression, and the USSR and its “followers” accusing 
the government of Greece of being responsible for the situation, of having imperialistic 
ambitions regarding its neighbors, and of segregating against democratic minorities. 
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At this meeting, the Egyptian representative, Mohamed Hussein Heykel Pasha, 
expressed Egypt’s concern regarding events in Greece, “primarily because Greece and 
Egypt are both Mediterranean nations, and then because peace is indivisible;”137 hoping 
that Greece would keep its territorial integrity; he affirmed not siding with any party, but 
strictly observing the principles of the Charter.  Consistent with Egypt’s position 
regarding Spain and South Africa, he recalled that Article 2 (7) of the Charter does not 
allow making judgment on the internal affairs of Greece.  Moreover, the purpose was not 
to blame parties for their responsibility, but to replace conflict with peace.  He 
condemned the presence of foreign troops not only in Greece, but in the entirety of the 
Balkan states, describing them as a mere result of Western/Eastern conflicts; he 
considered them to be a violation of the independence and integrity of those states.  Once 
more keeping a neutral/non-aligned position holding only the Charter as a guide, he added 
that neither the Eastern nor the Western states would be pleased with Egypt’s position, 
but that the latter “subscribes definitely, conscious that the Charter rests on collective 
security, to the disarmament of nations…”138 Heykel Pasha concluded by suggesting that 
the Committee assigned to the Balkans would be a Conciliation Committee rather than an 
investigative one, in order to end the conflicts at the frontiers, and re-establish normal 
diplomatic relations and neighborhood.139
The following year, the unresolved issue was brought up again at the First Committee.  
The USA, Britain, France, and China proposed a resolution that would, among other 
things, stop any aid to guerillas or threats to the territorial integrity of Greece.  The 
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resolution was then adopted as Resolution 193 (III) of 27 November 1948 of the General 
Assembly,140 calling, among other things, for the end of armed conflict, and peaceful 
settlement between Greece on one side, and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the 
other.141  The Egyptian delegate to the First Committee for that year was Adly Andraos.  
He was supportive of the resolution, and his words confirmed his predecessor’s line 
befriending Greece, reminding of the multi millenary ties binding Greece and Egypt, and 
their common interest along the coasts of a common sea; he confirmed that Egypt could 
not remain indifferent to Greece’s fate.  He stressed that Greece’s problem was also one 
of interfering in a state’s internal affairs, which could happen to any medium or small 
nation.  Again, he said that regardless of Greece’s internal politics, behind every obstacle 
hindering a solution laid the conflict of the interests of the great powers in the strategic 
areas.  At that time, Egypt was at war in Palestine, as will be discussed in the coming 
chapter, and Andraos did not miss the opportunity to draw the attention of the states 
proposing the resolution for Greece that “while they are invoking the danger of a 
communist infiltration in the Balkans, they seem to forget that 300 kilometers away from 
Egypt, they are creating a dangerous hearth of infection.”142
Andraos’s remark is first a reminder that the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-
intervention in states’ internal affairs are rights for all nations, not only for the ones that 
the West is interested in.  It also shows that Egypt, in voting with the West against the 
Eastern bloc on the Greek issue, remained impartial, holding the West responsible for the 
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Palestinian problem.  Finally, it reflects Egypt’s involvement as the Arab Leader 
determined to defend the rights of an Arab nation, Palestine. 
 
D. Italian Colonies: Egypt, the Islamic Leader 
The interest in bringing the issue of the Italian colonies is in the role Egypt played as a 
leader.  Among the papers found in Adly Andraos’s files were several letters from former 
Italian colonies requesting that Egypt speak for their cause at the United Nations.  In fact, 
the USA, France, Britain and the USSR had sent a communication to the Secretary-
General informing him that the question of these colonies was to be referred to the 
General Assembly in compliance with Article 23 (3) of Annex XI of the Treaty of Peace 
with Italy;143 the mentioned article stated that if within one year the four powers had not 
agreed upon the disposal of the colonies, the matter would be bought to the General 
Assembly for recommendation.144 A special subcommittee was formed to consider which 
native groups should be heard in discussions on the disposal of their territories; Egypt was 
chosen as one of the members of that subcommittee.145
One of the letters found, dated 17 September 1948 is addressed to Khashaba Pasha, 
head of the Egyptian delegation to the United Nations in 1948; its sender is the owner and 
director of a magazine called Al ‘Alam al ‘Arabi (The Arab World).  Mr. Shehata, the 
director, thereby forwarded to the Egyptian representative a copy of a petition submitted 
by the Eritrean Muslim League, requesting the Egyptian delegation to intervene on their 
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behalf at the United Nations.  Their plea was to give total independence to Eritrea, even if 
after a trusteeship period of ten years, and not to annex Eritrea to Ethiopia under any 
circumstances.146 Another letter dated 19 September urged the Arab League headed by 
Egypt to convey to the four powers that annexing Eritrea to Ethiopia was of utmost 
danger due to the basic differences between the two peoples.  Eritrea was divided in two: 
the Unionists, who wanted a union with Ethiopia which was a Christian State, and the 
Muslim League, who wanted total independence for Eritrea which was of a Muslim 
majority.  But the British after giving the Eritreans hopes declared that they favored 
incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia.  They thus jeopardized the Muslim Leagues’ hopes 
for independence.147
Egypt’s leadership of the Arab League was also beneficial for other Italian colonies.  
Resolution 289 (IV) of 21 November 1949 of the General Assembly gave Libya 
independence after pressure from the League headed by Egypt.  The same resolution put 
Somaliland under the Trusteeship system for Italian administration – although a telegram 
to the delegate of the Arab League indicates that the Somalis wanted their land to be 
united and independent, and refused the administration of the Italians;
 It was with these hopes that they had appealed to Egypt, as a Muslim 
state. 
148
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In addition to its efficiency as an Arab and Muslim leader, Egypt was appointed by the 
same resolution – 289 (IV) – in the council to help Libya draft its constitution as an 
independent state;149 it was also appointed as an African state in the advisory committee 
in charge of helping the administration of the Italian trusteeship over Somaliland.150 
Eritrea was eventually united with Ethiopia as an independent country having its own 
constitution.151
Hence, Egypt’s position in the issue of the former Italian colonies enhances a triple 
identity: African, Arab and Muslim.  It also confirms the status of Egypt as the leader of 
the nations of the region, and the mediator helping to achieve the self-determination of 
the smaller nations, and their establishment as independent states. 
 
 
E. Morocco and Tunisia: Egypt Takes the Initiative 
As the Cold War swept the world, smaller nations, such as Egypt and the other Arab 
states, had every reason to fight for their independence; on the one hand the USSR had a 
radically anti-imperialist attitude, and on the other the West feared the spreading of 
USSR’s communist ideology.  The Arab states headed by Egypt therefore brought up the 
issue of Morocco at the meeting of the First Committee in November, 1951, demanding 
the termination of French colonialism there.  The Western states, however, evaded the 
debate on the issue; Canada, conscious of the danger of the Arab intervention, presented a 
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proposal to postpone debating the issue.152 The proposal was adopted due to the support 
of Britain, the Dominican Republic, France, Norway, and the United States.153 But Egypt 
offered a counter-proposal to immediately include the Moroccan issue in the agenda. The 
French Foreign Minister explained that France and Morocco were undergoing 
negotiations concerning their future relations, and that stirring the issue at that point could 
have negative effects on the talks.  The Egyptian representative agreed to postpone the 
issue only for a short while longer.154
We heard an extremely inspiring speech when Ambassador Adly Andraos, the 
brilliant Egyptian Delegate who tends towards the French, challenge 
Monsieur Schuman the French Foreign Minister… Andraos’s speech in 
French was marvelous… and by using a mixture of history, flattering France, 
its culture and its civilization, adopting the French principles and stands, 
Andraos destroyed the French case…
  The subject was brought up once again at the 
meeting of the General Assembly in spite of French protests.  In his book Farouk al awal 
al malik alladhy ghadar bih al jamyᶜ  (Farouk I The King Whom Everybody Betrayed), 
Adel Thabet describes the eloquent speech made by the Egyptian delegate to the General 
Assembly: 
155
Thabet goes on to say that the proposal to condemn French colonialism was only 
avoided by Mr. Schuman’s intervention: “Please, do not condemn France!”
 
156
After 1952, the Moroccan question, together with the Tunisian one,
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considered.”158 Morocco eventually gained independence in 1956,159 and so did Tunisia 
in the same year.160
Thus, Egypt moved along from the drafting of the charter as a small nation attempting 
to voice its revulsion against Britain, sticking to the enemy of colonialism, i.e. the USSR, 
to demanding self-determination for others.   From a subjugated colonized country, it 
became a leader standing by the other nations who were not independent.  If being at the 
United Nations was an opportunity to speak up, Egypt, to say the least, brilliantly used it 
as a tool to promote its status and foreign policy.  It used its position as a member of the 
diverse committees there, and used the Charter as its primary reference to legally achieve 
its ultimate goal, independence.  It stood on its feet, respecting the sovereignty of others 
in order to have its own sovereignty respected, and struggling for the self-determination 
of others in order to acquire its own.  Egypt followed one and the same line all the way 
through. 
 
From all of the above, then, one can conclude that Egypt was loyal to the principles of 
sovereignty and self-determination, a principle which it first wanted for itself, and which 
led it to adopt a policy of impartiality and support to all the nations who needed its 
support.  It could therefore not remain indifferent when a fellow Arab nation was under 
the threat of having its integrity violated: Palestine is the subject of next chapter.  It shows 
how Egypt, as an Arab leader struggled for the sovereignty of Palestine and the right to 
self-determination of the Palestinians. 
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VI. Palestine: Egypt and Fellow Arabs 
The issue of Palestine was and still is central for Egypt. The Palestinian question which 
has tormented the Arabs since the end of World War II till this day is much broader than 
could be stated in a few words or even a few paragraphs.  For Egypt, Palestine was more 
than an external issue.   Within Egypt, the nationalists considered going to war for 
Palestine a manifestation of patriotism, consequently of fighting against imperialism.161  
While approaching this chapter, several points must be kept in mind.  First, that Egypt 
considered itself to be an Arab leader, and therefore could not ignore the role it had to 
play to safeguard the integrity of Palestine.  Second, that touching upon the integrity of 
the Palestinian territory was another manifestation of the colonialism which had been 
Egypt’s major problem for years.  Third, that Egypt feared the Israelis’ ambition to 
spread.162  Finally and most important of all, that the Palestinians who had to flee their 
homes need support, food and shelter.  The burden to support these refugees fell on the 
shoulders of their neighboring states.  For all these reasons, Egypt had once again to 
exercise its policy of anti-colonialism, and of fighting for the Palestinian right to self 
determination, and the human dignity of the Palestinians.  Once again, it will be shown, 
Egypt neither sided with the British who were responsible for the immigration of the Jews 
to Palestine,163
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quality of Jews to the Middle-Eastern region.164
 
A. Historical Background of Palestine 
 Egypt fought its own battle for Palestine 
and the Palestinians. 
It is worthy here to introduce some background history of Palestine.  In 1915, the Arabs 
were revolting against the Ottoman Empire, and the British, holding the Ottomans as 
enemies and allies of the Germans in World War I, and striving to weaken their empire, 
supported the Arabs; the Hussein-McMahon correspondence between the Sherif of Mecca 
and the British High Commissioner for Egypt offered the Arabs land which was 
understood by the Arabs to include Palestine.165 Only two years later, in 1917, the British 
Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, expressed that Britain’s government, holding 
the Mandate on Palestine, “view[s] with favour [sic] the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people.”166  The Arab members of the United Nations 
reacted violently to that declaration, and rejected any proposal of partition made by the 
British to solve the problem. But Jewish immigration to Palestine could not be stopped; 
even though it was officially limited by the Mandatory power in the 1939,167 illegal 
immigrants kept pouring in between 1939 and 1942, then between 1945 and 1948.168
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frictions between the Arabs and the Jews were more than the British could handle; it was 
time to end the mandate over Palestine.169
 
B. World Scene and the Palestinian Question 
 
Egyptian involvement in the issue of Palestine at the United Nations cannot be 
dissociated from the evolution of Egypt’s internal political scene as mentioned above,170 
in conjunction with the international change in the status of world powers.  The 
Palestinian problem occurred at a time in Egypt, when nationalists targeted a total ousting 
of the British from their land, while the government negotiated new ententes with the 
colonial power, trying to terminate the 1936 Treaty.171  Internationally, the Cold War was 
settling in, and the world order was taking a new shape.  The United States was 
increasingly becoming of a global power, and on the other side, the USSR, a former ally, 
was becoming a potential danger to the Western States because of its opposition to 
colonialism.  Therefore, the USA, who was initially strongly anti-imperial, started turning 
a blind eye to Britain’s policies so that the West formed one bloc.172 Britain, whose 
imperialistic power was severely declining after the mandates were terminated one after 
the other from Burma, to Ceylon, then India and Pakistan…,173
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 sought USA’s support for 
whatever was left to Britain – most importantly Egypt because of its geostrategic 
importance.   Thus, in negotiating with its British occupier, Egypt used the new 
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relationship between Britain and the USA, to counter balance the fear the West had of 
losing Egypt to the USSR.  Egypt had always had significant importance due to both its 
geographical position and its role as a political leader in the region.  Hence, Palestine was 
among other things, a bargaining chip which would play one side of the world against the 
other.  Was Egypt going to look at Palestine as a cause to defend its belief in promoting 
human rights and self-determination? Was Palestine a reason to ally with the Arabs and 
strengthen the Arab League in order to face the British with more power?  In other words, 
was this Palestinian issue, which has remained unresolved to this very day, a means or an 
end for Egypt?   The hypothesis which is suggested hereafter is that Palestine was both a 
means and an end for Egypt. 
 
C. Egypt’s Position Prior to UN Intervention 
Prior to the intervention of the United Nations in the Palestinian question, Egypt’s 
position towards Palestine wavered between accepting the partition of the territory, and 
fighting for that land.  At a certain point in time, specifically in the summer of 1946, 
Egypt was willing to accept a partition plan for Palestine, in spite of the revolt of other 
Arab states.174  As a matter of fact, the Chief expert on Arab Affairs in the Jewish 
Agency, Eliyahu Sasson, visited Cairo in the month of August of that year.  He met with 
Abd al-Rahman Azzam, the head of the one year old Arab League, and with Ismail Sidqi 
Pasha, Egypt’s Prime Minister, and lobbied their support for a partition.175
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  If Azzam was 
reluctant to be compromised with the other Arab states, the Prime Minister overtly 
175 Id. at 98. 
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offered cooperation in return for the British moving their bases out of Egypt and into 
Palestine.176
Sasson and Sidqi Pasha found a common interest in fighting a common enemy: Britain.  
Moreover, Sidqi found the deal advantageous, especially considering the people’s revolt 
at the Anglo-Egyptian talks which kept Britain empowered in Egypt.
  Right there, it was offered to Egypt to instantly get rid of colonialism, an 
aim it had been seeking for years, but which would entail that Egypt renounces to the 
other aspects it had developed, namely its leadership of the Arab world and its struggle 
for the principle of self-determination for all nations, by sacrificing Palestine. 
177  Michael Doran 
further explains that Sidqi’s foreign policy was one of “Insular Egypt;”178 and although 
the Sasson plan did not materialize, “it cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the study of 
Egyptian foreign policy, for it betrays much regarding the intellectual framework in 
which the Egyptian elite approached the problem of Palestine.”179 Officially, however, 
the Egyptian position was pro-Arab and pro-self determination for Palestine.180
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 Sidqi’s 
government which regarded Palestine as a means to get rid of the British rather than an 
end in itself was replaced in December of the same year.  The new government brought 
with it an Egyptian policy more sympathetic to the issue of Palestine, and more openly 
challenging to the British, in the sense that it was willing to bring its conflict with the 
colonial power to an international level, i.e. the United Nations.  In fact, the new Prime 
Minister, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha, brought the Anglo-Egyptian dispute to the 
Security Council calling for independence, but in vain, because the Council – including 
177 Id. 
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the USA – voted for direct negotiations between the two parties.181  This was when Egypt 
realized that the USA would not jeopardize its alliance with Britain – while the Eastern 
bloc strongly supported Egypt against the British.182 This was one good reason for Egypt 
to give up on calling for the support of the USA against imperialism.  It was then left with 
only two means to achieve its goal of independence: impartiality and the Arab bloc.183
 
D. Intervention of the United Nations 
 
The Palestinian question was first brought to the General Assembly on the 2nd of April, 
1947, by a request from the British, whose mandate over Palestine was to end the 
following year.184  The first Special Session of the General Assembly took place on April 
28th.185  Egypt, with other Arab states, demanded that discussions also include “the 
termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence,”186 but 
the Arab proposal was voted against.187  Subsequently, the First Committee of the 
General Assembly formed a Special Committee on Palestine to study and report on the 
situation in Palestine; the elected members of the committee excluded the big powers as 
well as all Arab nations, presumably in order to retrieve neutral reports.188
Seven months later, the report of the Special Committee on Palestine was ready, 
recommending the termination of the Mandate, and a period of transition under the 
 
                                                             
181 Id. at 59-60. 
182 Id. at 60. 
183 See supra chapt. II § A, at 9. 
184 General Assembly, 1 INT”L ORG. 488, 488 (Sep., 1947). 
185 Id.  
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 489. 
58 
 
United Nations’ auspices, while appealing on the Palestinians to end violence.189  The 
committee also proposed a partition plan that would enable both Palestinians and Jews to 
have their respective lands, while forming an economic unity.190
While the Jews accepted the contents of the report, the Arab states vehemently opposed 
it.  Nevertheless, Resolution 181 (II) was adopted on the 29th of November, 1947, by 33 
votes to 13, with ten abstentions, dividing Palestine in one state for the Arabs and another 
for the Jews, while making Jerusalem international.
 
191 Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and 
Yemen, (and Pakistan), announced that their countries would not be bound by the 
resolution.192
The United Nations Palestine Commission, established by Resolution 181 (II) in order 
to implement the partition plan, reported that the situation was far from improving: 
  Strangely enough, Egypt’s reaction was not reported at this point, probably 
because there was internal uncertainty, and it was not sure it wanted to take radical action, 
as will be explained below. 
Powerful Arab forces, both inside and outside Palestine, were defying the 
General Assembly resolution, and the Arab Higher Committee had informed 
the Secretary-General that “any attempt by the Jews or any power or group of 
powers to establish a Jewish state in Arab territory is an act of aggression 
which will be resisted in self-defense by force.”193
In addition to the total lack of cooperation and armed resistance of the Arabs, Britain 
had signified that it would not interfere or bear any responsibility, except the one of 
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ending its mandate by May 15th, 1948;194
Attempts to bring a solution to the Palestine problem prior to the end of the mandate 
failed.  The Jews rejected any solution but a State of Israel based on the 1947 partition 
plan proposal, and the Arabs qualified it as “geographically impossible.”
 all this rendered the mission of the Palestine 
Commission impossible.  As confrontation and bloodshed continued, the economy 
worsened, and a food shortage threatened.  The Commission warned against the disaster it 
anticipated after the departure of the British troops. 
195
On the 14th of May, a provisional government for Israel was announced at the meeting 
of the General Assembly, approved by the USA.
 
196  British troops withdrew from 
Palestine.197  On the 15th of May, Arab troops spread in Palestine, with the purpose of 
bringing it all back to the Arabs, “the Egyptian state intervened in Palestine as the 
political leader of a military coalition.”198
In Cairo, al-Nuqrashi Pasha had met with some senators in a closed session, inciting 
them to approve sending forces for the security of Palestine.
 
199  Former Prime Minister 
Sidqi opposed the idea fervently, favoring negotiations with the Jews.200
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  In addition to 
doubting the capacities of the Egyptian army kept weak by the British who wanted to 
protect themselves, Sidqi also said that Egypt did not have the same interest in Palestine 
as its Arab neighbors did, and that consequently it was not worth risking going to war – a 
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war which he foresaw would end in a disaster for his country.201 It is to be reminded that 
Sidqi targeted Egypt’s self-determination and independence from Britain, and was less 
interested in the Palestinian cause as an end.  Al-Nuqrashi disregarded Sidqi Pasha’s 
opinion, and followed his own policy, intending to “honor prior commitments to the Arab 
League.”202  He chose to keep the role of the leading nation that would fight for the rights 
of a fellow Arab nation.  Egypt, in order to honor this commitment, went to war against 
the Jews, achieving some success in the early stages, but ultimately defeated heavily and 
losing land.  The war lasted till October 1949, interrupted only by two periods of truce 
managed by the Security Council.  Egypt, who had previously strongly rebutted any 
concession to Zionist ambitions, was the first Arab country to consider negotiating an 
armistice with Israel, as the losses it incurred during the war made its loyalty to pan-
Arabism waver for a little while in the balance against its own interest.203
On the 20th of May 1948, while the war was on, the United Nations appointed the 
Swedish diplomat, Count Folke Bernadotte, as a Mediator in Palestine.
 
204  Bernadotte 
wrote a report acknowledging the existence of an Israeli State, and assuring that it would 
continue to exist.205  This means that the qualifications of the illegal Jewish immigrants 
who poured in had enabled a state of Israel to be established in less than one year. The 
Egyptian dream of setting Palestine free was thus fading away. The Mediator, however, 
recommended limiting that state to smaller parts of land.206
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  He also expressed great 
concern for refugees who had been displaced after fleeing bloodshed, and recommended 
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their repatriation under United Nations supervision.207  No one was happy; the Arabs 
maintained that Palestine was indivisible, and the Jews insisted on keeping the boundaries 
of 1947.208  Count Bernadotte was assassinated by Zionists in Jerusalem shortly after he 
submitted his report.209
The assassination of the mediator was used by Adly Andraos Bey in a meeting of the 
First Committee discussing the status and participation of the Arab Higher Committee in 
the debates related to the problem of Palestine.  The Arab Higher Committee, which was 
a union of the Arab nationalist groups,
 And the refugees were about to become the core of Egypt’s 
activities at the United Nations as will be shown below. 
210
He pointed out that the Provisional Government of Israel had not been 
recognized de jure by any State.  It had been given de facto recognition by 
certain Member States, in spite of the fact that it did not have a defined 
territory, and in spite of its inability to maintain law and order within the 
territory which it claimed to govern, as was demonstrated by the recent 
assassination of the United Nations Mediator.  The Arab Government, on the 
contrary, represented the people who had inhabited Palestine for centuries, 
and who, under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, had an 
unequivocal right to that country.
 was to speak on behalf of the Arabs of 
Palestine. As the Chairman of the Committee was reluctant to recognize the Arab Higher 
Committee as representative of the All Palestine Government, Andraos Bey launched his 
attack. 
211
Andraos Bey, by this statement, at once condemned the illegal existence of the 
State of Israel, and explained how it violated the integrity of the Palestinian territory 
 
                                                             
207 Id.. 
208 Id. at 57. 
209 See General Assembly, 3 INT”L ORG. 288, 290 (May, 1949).  See also generally Cary David Stanger, A 
Haunting LegacyThe Assassination of Count Bernadotte, 42 MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 260 (Spring, 1988). 
210 Supra note 11, at 119. 
211 U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 200th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/648 (Nov. 15, 1948). 
62 
 
which by international law was the right of the Arabs.  The statement was also an 
accusation to both East and West who did not prevent the existence of Israel. 
It is noteworthy that during this same session, the question of Korea had been put on 
the agenda of the committee before the issue of Palestine.  In the same spirit defending 
the rights of the Palestinians and accusing the Great Powers, Andraos Bey refrained from 
voting for the Korean resolution in favor of the West, as he 
considered that the urgency of the Palestine question brooked no delay. . . 
welcomed the consideration shown by the representatives of the USSR and of 
Czechoslovakia for safeguarding the rights of the Korean people to take part 
in a debate which so closely concerned them [emphasis added] and he hoped 
that the same consideration would be displayed in respect of the Arab 
population of Palestine…212
At the General Assembly, Ahmed Khashaba Pasha, head of the Egyptian delegation, 
did not spare the audience attacks on Israel either.  In his speech, he criticized the 
partition plan which he saw as deviating largely from the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and which could not be implemented due to the conflicts between the 
Arabs and the Jews. He also blamed the late Mediator for accepting a fait accompli, and 
called upon the Member States of the General Assembly not to follow his path.
 
213  He 
added that the Jewish ambitions had no limits, and that they represented a threat to the 
peace and security in the entire region;214
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 he referred to the massive immigration of the 
Jews to Palestine which jeopardized the previously good relations which existed between 
the Arabs and the Jews of the area.  He expressed fear from the quality of Jewish people 
who came to the region with communist principles that would endanger the whole 
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Middle-East.215  Finally, he exposed concern over the resources of the region which 
would now not suffice considering the increase in the number of inhabitants, and the 
economic problems it would entail.216  At his inaugural speech, Khashaba Pasha had not 
missed to condemn the negative behavior of the United Nations which led to more than 
half a million Arab Palestinians to become homeless and hungry, their basic rights 
violated.217
Khashaba Pasha, it should be remarked, once again made reference to the Charter in 
order to make his point irrefutable while rejecting the partition plan.  He also used the 
language of a peace loving nation when he accused the Jews of endangering the security 
of the region.  Moreover, he confirmed Egypt’s impartiality by attacking “communist 
principles,” when at the same time his country was struggling against British colonialism. 
 
Nonetheless, the USA supported Moshe Shertok, the Foreign Minister of Israel when 
he addressed the Security Council, saying that the State of Israel was already established, 
and that it was not human to take the land away from the people after they had settled, as 
Count Bernadotte had proposed.218
We appeal to the States Members of the Security Council to accept our 
application for membership when it is submitted.  We appeal to the States 
Members of the Assembly to approve it.  Israel has waited long and patiently 
  He added that it would be unnatural for Arabs to 
make a life amongst the Jews, and that they would be better off in their neighboring sister 
Arab countries.  Shertok concluded his speech with the following words: 
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for her seat in the Community of Nations.  We believe that our time has 
come.219
In a rough draft of a project, Adly Andraos scribbled that Israel’s admission to the 
United Nations would constitute a violation to Article 4 of the Charter, because it lacked 
the qualifications implied in the article, namely that it be a sovereign, peace loving state, 
accepting and capable of assuming the obligations of the Charter.
 
220  Israel, to him, was 
not even a state because it was not recognized de jure, it was certainly not peace-loving, 
and it was the perpetrator of violations of the Charter.221  In spite of these objections, 
Israel was admitted to the United Nations on May 11th, 1949.222
The situation between the Arabs and the Jews never improved.  The Palestine 
Conciliation Commission attempted for a long time to bring the two parties together, but 
they would each stick to their respective points of view, and none was ready for any 
concession.  But the Arabs’ focus had by then shifted to the issue of the Palestinian 
refugees, first and foremost.
 
223 By December 1951, the Conciliation Commission 
reported a three year failure in trying to “conciliate” between the Arabs and the Jews, and 
was ready to renounce its mission.224
From the writer’s point of view, Egypt’s reaction towards the Palestinian issue was at 
first one of outrage and defiance.  But if Sidqi Pasha’s cabinet favored to focus on 
asserting self-determination and independence far from Arabism and far from war, 
nationalists surely held Palestine as an end in itself.  It is my personal conclusion as well, 
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that this was an opportunity for the Egyptian al-Nuqrashi Pasha’s cabinet in power at the 
time to have the support of its people in order to be able to maintain its place at a time 
when internal turmoil was at its peak.  Thus, Egypt could assert itself both as an Arab 
leader struggling for Palestine’s rights, and a supporter of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.  Palestine, then, was both a means for Egypt to reaffirm its status of leadership 
and act as a power rather than a submitted nation, and an end, as Egypt had adopted the 
principle of self-determination inherent in the Charter, and hence rejected the violations 
against Palestine… and with time, it became a habit. 
Humanly, however, the question of the Palestinian people remains a genuine concern. 
 
E. Refugees and Displaced Persons 
Refugees and displaced persons soon became an issue that challenged Egypt to find 
means to aid these people.  Count Bernadotte, as previously mentioned, had expressed 
concern about displaced persons.  The number of Palestinian refugees at the time of the 
report was approximately 500,000.225  The size of the problem was such that it took 
priority over the Arab-Israeli conflict.  The issue was referred to the Third Committee, the 
Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee, which established Sub-Committee 2 to 
draw up plans for the future of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons.  Egypt was the 
only member of the Arab League to be appointed to this subcommittee.226
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The discussions which took place during the meetings of Sub-Committee 2 indicate 
that the humanitarian question of the refugees did not temper political interests.  Egypt’s 
representative in the talks for the refugees in 1948 was Adly Andraos.  His report on the 
activities of Sub-Committee 2 reflects his struggle to neutralize “destructive” [sic] 
proposals and acquire the most for the Palestinians in the quickest time possible, in order 
to rescue the refugees before winter which was at the doors.227
In response to a Bolivian proposal to gather money from all over the world, Andraos 
Bey objected first because it would take too long, and the help was needed urgently and 
second because this would only be a temporary solution.  He stressed that a large share of 
the responsibility fell on the shoulders of the United Nations, because the status of the 
Palestinian refugees would not have reached that low of a level had the organization 
considered them earlier.
  Once more, Egypt was 
not there to applaud the Great Powers, but to establish its own opinion. 
228
At another instance, Andraos Bey responded violently when the Polish representative – 
supported by his Russian colleague – suggested that the humanitarian issue of the 
refugees did not end at giving them food and help, but that they should be given their 
homes back; this, he said, could only be solved if the “states responsible for the 
displacement” of these people would accept the partition which came in the General 
Assembly’s resolution, in other words, the issue should be solved politically at the 
  Andraos Bey was probably alluding to the meeting when the 
Korean issue was placed before Palestine, and when Egypt abstained from voting pro-
West. 
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Political Committee.  The Egyptian delegate agreed with the necessity to find a solution 
for the displaced persons; he confirmed that the Palestinian refugees could not live 
homeless forever relying on exterior help, that they had to regain their human dignity by 
being repatriated.  But he wondered at the intervention of a representative from the 
Eastern bloc, reminding that it was European Jews who came from Central Europe who 
had arrived to the region using terrorist means, disrupting the peaceful coexistence which 
once existed between the Arabs and the Jews. Andraos Bey further insisted on 
differentiating between the humanitarian issue and politics, and requested the committee 
to study the question of repatriation of the refugees.229
The core of this message is that if the Palestinian self-determination and territorial 
integrity are questions of political disputes between nations, humanitarian issues exclude 
all conflicts.  If Egypt, Israel and others quarrel about land property and the self 
determination of Palestine at the Political Committee, there was no room for quarrel at a 
committee finding humanitarian solutions, and solutions had to be found immediately.  
This political capacity of differentiating between the types of relations brings to the mind 
Egypt’s policy regarding the questions of Spain and South Africa mentioned above. 
 
A third proposal to which the Egyptian representative objected came from the French 
delegate, supported by the representative of New Zealand (who Andraos describes as 
having well known Zionist tendencies).  The proposal was that the General Assembly add 
to any resolution a sentence of gratitude towards the states who participated in rescuing 
the refugees, in order to encourage them to keep doing so.  But Adly Andraos’s reaction 
was that this would turn the issue into a “family matter” concerning the Arabs, and only 
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aided by the others, while actually the matter concerned all of the United Nations.  No 
reward, he said, was required for a humanitarian deed.230
But Egypt did not only object to proposals, it also had its own.  Andraos Bey first 
proposed that assistance offered to the refugees and displaced persons be distributed 
proportionate to the numbers in the respective camps; he explained that there were about 
seven thousand displaced Jews, while the Palestinians amounted to more than 700,000. It 
would thus be unfair to give both groups equal amounts of aid.  Justice, he said, had it 
that no group lives under better circumstances than the other, and that there be no 
discrimination.
 In other words, he told the 
Assembly that they should regard Palestine as an Arab question which does not concern 
them, that actually, the Palestinian issue was a humanitarian one, and a responsibility of 
all the Member States. 
231
The representative of New Zealand objected to the discrimination issue, as justice and 
equality are inherent in the Charter.  After long debates (some of which took place outside 
the conference room) a compromise was reached: the Secretary-General would just have 
to give a written guarantee that there would be equality and justice in the distribution, 
without wording being added to the resolution.    At this point, the delegate of the USSR 
strongly attacked the Egyptian proposal, saying that it reflected the greed and 
materialistic penchant of the Arab states, and accusing the Arabs of exaggerating the 
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numbers, the Mediator’s report having stated that there were 500,000 refugees, and 
Andraos saying they were more than 700,000.232
To this, Adly Andraos expressed his surprise at Egypt being accused of greed and 
materialism when it was a nation which had sacrificed for Palestine with nothing in 
return.  He accused the USSR of adding to the dissension in Palestine in order to renew 
the ambitions of the Russian Tsars to reach the Mediterranean, and hence control the 
Middle-East.  As to the number of the refugees, Andraos explained, it had increased since 
the report was written, and it would keep increasing by the hour, due to the terrorism and 
destruction perpetrated by the Zionists who were encouraged by Russia and Poland.
 
233
Small-nation-Egypt was not there anymore, only the leader bearing the responsibility of 
the Palestinian refugees was.  Egypt was now accusing the principal enemy of 
imperialism of having imperialistic ambitions itself, which might explain why Egypt 
chose to keep the distance with the USSR: it was a threat to its independence.  In any 
case, Egypt succeeded, and the proposal in its compromised form was adopted. Britain, 
France, and the USA offered financial donations right away.
 
234
The second proposal made by Egypt concerned the headquarters of the Director of the 
Palestine Refugee Relief. It had been suggested by the Secretary-General that the director 
would choose the place which would be most convenient for him to have his 
headquarters.  Andraos Bey, however, felt that the headquarters would best be in a place 
near the region in trouble, for the director to have easier access. Although the 
 
                                                             
232 Report on the Work of the Special Committee on the Palestinian Refugees Question 6 (1948) (on file 
with author) (my translation). 
233 Id. at 6-7. 
234 Id. at 8-9. 
70 
 
representatives of the Arabs and some Latin American states supported Egypt affirming 
that “modern means such as the radio and airplanes do not compensate for direct contact 
between the doctor and his patient,”235 as astonishing as it might seem, there were 
objections to this proposal as well.  When the Greek representative offered Rhodes to be 
the headquarters, the delegate of the Secretary-General strongly objected, saying that it 
was not the director’s duty to personally handle relief; his job was to collect donations 
and coordinate among the volunteer organizations, and this did not require his presence in 
the Middle-East.  The Committee was divided, the USA and Britain siding with the 
Secretary-General’s delegate and Belgium siding with Egypt.236
The Egyptian delegate wrote that the representative of New Zealand had asked Adly 
Andraos privately to withdraw his proposal in consideration of the Secretary-General’s 
opinion, for better cooperation in the humanitarian rescue mission.  Andraos was outraged 
that the Secretary-General’s opinion would weigh so much at a time when relief for the 
Palestinians was so urgent, and he expressed his annoyance at the objections of the 
Secretary-General and his men to any proposal made by him or any other Arab delegate; 
he maintained his position and on roll call, his proposal was adopted by 20 votes to 9 with 
17 abstentions.
 
237  At this point, the Secretary-General questioned the feasibility of 
moving the headquarters of the Director of Relief to the Middle-East for financial 
reasons.  The issue had to be put before the General Assembly.238
Prior to the General Assembly, Mr. Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General, called on Adly 
Andraos and his colleague, together with the Saudi Arabian representative and the head of 
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the Third Committee, Charles Malik.  On the occasion, Adly Andraos writes, he could 
only say openly to Mr. Trygve Lie that the attitude of the United Nations put doubt in the 
minds of the Arabs, who needed to have more confidence in the organization.  He insisted 
that the Director of Relief needed to be closer to the region in order for him to get a feel 
for what was happening, and for them to feel that the civilized world cared for them.  The 
following day, delegates of some Member States offered compromised wording which 
was compatible with the Egyptian proposal, but which appeared to be a step coming from 
the Secretary-General, not imposed on him; it suggested that the Director have two 
headquarters, one in the region, the other where it was convenient for him, and that there 
would be an important official to replace him in his absence.239
The purpose of bringing all the previous discussion here is to show that Egypt had 
reached a point when it could intervene with enough influence to provoke unfounded 
objections from some members of the Assembly when its proposals conflicted with their 
interests.  Egypt was now a strong small nation. 
 
The issue of the refugees is still major until this very day.  But this does not mean that 
Egypt failed.  As a matter of fact, it is the whole world that has failed with regard to the 
Palestinian issue.  As for Egypt, in spite of Palestine being a central question in its foreign 
policy, it evolved and matured, as it was repeatedly said here, from a subjected nation to 
one with power.  It set a goal of acquiring self-determination, and held to the principle of 
supporting all non-self-governing nations in their struggle for independence. Again, it 
managed to remain impartial throughout its history at the United Nations between 1945 
and 1952. 
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VII. Conclusion 
Human rights issues are many; and the self-determination of nations is far from being 
the least important.  Egypt had a taste of being ruled by foreign powers, and the United 
Nations and its Charter have enabled this country to voice its opposition to colonialism, to 
affirm its political existence, and to stand by smaller nations to help them acquire 
independence and self-determination.  Independence that is, from East and from West, as 
Egypt was sure not to side with the Eastern bloc to destabilize imperialist powers. Rather, 
its message was very clear that nations have the liberty to have their own policies, a sense 
of the sovereignty and dignity that the Charter of the United Nations offered to all the 
people. From drafting the Charter to going to war, Egypt did not falter: riddance from 
colonialist imposition it will be, and with that, the freedom to be impartial and the right to 
have sovereignty and self-determination not only for Egypt, but also for all the other 
states fallen under colonialism, like Morocco, Tunisia and so many others; or those 
banned from the good graces of the Great Powers, like Spain; or even nations whose 
territorial sovereignty was under threat, like Greece.  This stand that Egypt took in 
support of these nations has consolidated its affiliations with the Mediterranean states, 
with the African states, and most of all with the Arab states, still holding Palestine at the 
centre of their common concerns. 
It is noticeable that Egypt was rarely found discussing issues outside the scope it seems 
to have set for itself, namely the Arab World, Africa, and the Mediterranean. There are 
hardly any references to Egypt’s intervention in issues concerning the territorial integrity 
of, for example, China or Indonesia, although Adly Andraos wrote that Egypt was among 
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the first nations to lend a friendly hand to Indonesia in its struggle towards independence, 
and recognize it as a State.240
On the other hand, it is significant that Egypt abstained from voting for the USA 
proposal regarding China’s intervention in Korea.
 
241 This omission was Egypt’s message 
of non-partisanship with the West, or, in other words, its neutrality – the embryo of non-
alignment.242
The fruits of Egypt’s antagonism against imperialism only showed after the demise of 
the King; but one cannot deny that the seeds were sown several years before 1952, 
particularly expressed in the struggle at the meetings of the different committees as well 
as the General Assemblies of the United Nations, of men such as Adly Andraos and his 
fellow delegates.  Freedom, justice, peace, neutrality, and Arab nationalism have colored 
Egypt’s flag at the United Nations from 1945 to 1952. 
 All these facts can only confirm that Egypt’s main concern was to fight 
imperialism in order to assert independence for itself, as well as for all those who also 
needed it. 
And as the world order keeps evolving, the non-aligned movement was launched in 
1955.  African and Asian states held a conference in Bandung, Indonesia, which was 
attended by the Egyptian president.  There, “[t]hird World leaders shared their similar 
problems of resisting the pressures of the major powers, maintaining their independence 
and opposing colonialism and neo-colonialism, specially [sic] western domination.”243
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distance from the Soviet bloc.244
Egypt’s participation in the Bandung Conference is significant.  It shows that the 
Revolution did not antagonize the foreign policy which was followed by the King’s 
government.  The “neutrality” started by the nationalists in the 1940’s merely evolved in 
a new word, “non-alignment,” because the non-aligned states wanted to convey the 
message that they were not indifferent to world affairs: they were impartial.
 A reminder of the pre-1952 policy repeatedly 
emphasized in this paper. 
245
There are two faces to Egypt, then.  There is the Egypt that is constantly changing 
internally, from feudalism, to socialism, to capitalism… that oscillates between autocracy 
and democracy, the symbol of human rights.  And then there is the Egypt that teases the 
West by winking to the East and then distances itself from the East to stay in the middle.  
This is also the Egypt that maintains a consistent line to preserve the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and respect the sovereignty and self-determination of all 
peoples. 
 
However, it is noteworthy that Egypt is always an important party in, and often the 
leader of, a bloc such as the Arab League or the non-aligned states.  One cannot help 
wondering whether Egypt can pursue its foreign policy on its own, or whether it depends 
on certain coalitions to be able to pursue it.  In other words how independent Egypt truly 
is, and whether independence from East and from West did not throw Egypt in another 
kind of dependence: group dependence. 
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One also wonders whether impartiality was always the correct approach for Egypt to 
achieve its goals.  After all, today in 2008, when many nations have acquired official 
independence, and human rights are knocking at all doors, one of the issues for which 
Egypt struggled most since the 1940’s is still not resolved.  For more than sixty years, the 
United Nations organization, and all the well-intentioned states have failed to put an end 
to the Palestinian problem, and to secure the rights of Palestinian people.  A Kingdom 
was demised, four Presidents ruled the country, through war and peace, and Egypt still 
fights for the right to self-determination of an Arab nation. 
Today, we are far from those happy times when, at the San Francisco 
Conference, to cherish the Small Powers with hope, Senator Vandenberg 
promised them that they would be able to bring all their grievances to the 
General Assembly; and that the latter would be ‘the town hall of the 
World’.246
Adly Andraos 
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